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ABSTRACT
INCENTIVE DESIGN IN THREE LEVEL HIERARCHIES UNDER MORAL
HAZARD
ATAKAN AC¸IKGO¨Z
Economics, M.A. Thesis, June 2018
Thesis Advisor: Prof. Mehmet Bac¸
This thesis studies the incentives in multi-level hierarchical institutions under moral
hazard. The principal’s objective is to induce the agent exert “high” effort and a su-
pervisor is used to monitor either the agent’s effort or the output level. We extend a
canonical agent-supervisor-principal model by introducing ex-ante collusion possibili-
ties, whereby the parties can side-contract before execution of the official contract, that
is, before the supervisor and the agent incur their respective inspection and effort costs.
The thesis characterizes least-cost incentive contracts with and without ex-ante and ex-
post collusion possibilities. It is shown that preventing only ex-ante, or only ex-post,
collusion does not prevent the other automatically: the two collusion-proofness con-
straints are independent. Second, when full collusion possibilities are incorporated, the
only constraint that can be ignored is the supervisor’s incentive compatibility constraint
(implied by ex-ante collusion prevention). Third, it is shown that safeguarding against
ex-ante collusion raises the principal’s expected costs, in some cases “significantly”. We
discuss the effectiveness of preventing all types of collusion and show that despite of
increases in expected costs, the principal still finds preventing all types of collusions
optimal. Finally, we show that input monitoring is structurally more efficient than
output monitoring. If the same given monitoring technology is available and equally
effective in generating hard evidence, the supervisor should assess the effort level of the
agent and not the final output.
Keywords: hierarchy, corruption, collusion, incentives, contracts.
iv
O¨ZET
U¨C¸ KATMANLI HI˙YERARS¸I˙LERDE AHLAKI˙ TEHLI˙KE ALTINDA TES¸VI˙K
TASARIMI
ATAKAN AC¸IKGO¨Z
Ekonomi, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, Haziran 2018
Tez Danıs¸manı: Prof. Dr. Mehmet Bac¸
Bu tez, c¸ok katmanlı (Asil-Denetc¸i-Vekil) hiyerars¸ik bir kurumda, Vekil’den arzu edilen
seviyede efor elde edilmesini sag˘layacak optimal tes¸vik sistemlerini (u¨cret/bonus/ceza)
incelemektedir. Vekil’in “yu¨ksek” eforda c¸alıs¸masını sag˘lamak ic¸in Asil, bir denetc¸i kul-
lanarak Vekil’in eforunu veya u¨retim c¸ıktısını o¨lc¸ebilmektedir. Tez, bu standart modeli,
biri efor o¨ncesi ve dig˘eri efor sonrası olmak u¨zere iki zararlı is¸birlig˘i imkanı ekleyerek
zenginles¸tirmektedir. Efor o¨ncesi zararlı is¸birlig˘i, taraflar is¸ akdi gereg˘i yu¨ku¨mlu¨klerini
yerine getirmeye bas¸lamadan o¨nce, yani, Vekil efor seviyesini sec¸meden ve Denetc¸i
go¨zlem yapmaya bas¸lamadan o¨nce, bu iki tarafın kendi c¸ıkarları gereg˘i varabilecekleri
bir anlas¸madır. Efor sonrası zararlı is¸birlig˘i ise denetim sonucu ortaya c¸ıktıktan sonra
olus¸abilmektedir. Bu zararlı is¸birlig˘i imkanlarını ortadan kaldırmak, optimal tes¸vik
c¸o¨zu¨mleri ic¸in birer kısıt tes¸kil etmektedir. Tez’in bulguları s¸o¨yle o¨zetlenebilir: 1. Salt
efor o¨ncesi veya salt efor sonrası is¸birlig˘ini engellemek dig˘er is¸birlig˘i imkanını ortadan
kaldırmamaktadır (bu iki is¸birlig˘i kısıtı birbirinden bag˘ımsızdır.) 2. Her tu¨r zararlı
is¸birlig˘i tam olarak engellendig˘inde, go¨z ardı edilebilecek tek kısıt Denetc¸inin kis¸isel
tes¸vik kısıtıdır. 3. Efor o¨ncesi is¸birlig˘ini o¨nlemek maliyeti (bazı durumlarda belirgin
o¨lc¸u¨de) arttırmaktadır. Dolayısıyla is¸birliklerinin o¨nlenmesinin etkin olup olmadıg˘ını da
sorgulayıp, amac¸ her kos¸ulda Vekil’in efor sarfetmesini sag˘lamak ise, maliyet artıs¸larına
rag˘men bu is¸birliklerini o¨nlemenin Asil ac¸ısından optimal oldug˘u go¨sterilmektedir. 4.
Efor go¨zlemlenmesinin c¸ıktı go¨zlemlenmesine go¨re yapısal olarak maliyet ac¸ısından daha
verimli oldug˘u go¨sterilmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: hiyerars¸i, yolsuzluk, zararlı is¸birlig˘i, tes¸vikler, so¨zles¸meler.
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1 Introduction
The study of incentive design is an important field of research to improve our under-
standing of the operational problems that are typical to any hierarchical organization.
Members should be induced to perform the tasks assigned, but unobservability of ac-
tions, known in the literature as “moral hazard”, can create significant obstacles to this
end. Using supervisors to cope with this problem brings in a new question, concerning
the incentives of the supervisor whose actions may also not be observable. Moreover,
members of an organization can side-contract to improve their own benefits at the ex-
pense of members excluded from the group. This phenomenon, known in the literature
as “collusion”, leads to the collapse of the incentive structure.
In the economics literature, hierarchy is studied in its simplest three-layer form, the
agent-supervisor-principal model. Before moving on to the optimal incentive design
in hierarchies, it is useful to overview the agency problem between the agent and the
principal. The principal hires an agent to realize a task on behalf of himself because
the task may be too complicated or too costly for the principal. In this case, there can
exist two main problems due to information asymmetry. First, before the contracts
are executed, the principal may not be able to know the agent’s ability, effort cost or
any other characteristics that are known to agent. This is called the adverse selection
problem. Better searching mechanisms and contract design can help to deal with this
problem. The second problem is moral hazard mentioned above, also known as “hidden
action”. If the objectives of the principal and the agent are in conflict as they usually
are, the agent would not behave according to the principal’s interest because the agent
would pursue his own objective, which is to get the highest wage by exerting smallest
amount of effort. It would be naive to expect every agent have top ethical standards.
Therefore the agent should be offered wages and rewards that will make it in his own
interest to exert the effort the principal expects. The thesis adopts a hidden action
set-up where the agent’s effort level is only known to himself but the effort cost of the
agent is public information.
One solution to the agent’s moral hazard problem is monitoring, to collect infor-
mation about the agent’s actions. This monitoring task can be executed either by the
principal himself or by a delegated supervisor. The standard practice is to hire a su-
pervisor and delegate this task. However, inclusion of the supervisor into the system
creates further problems. Now that we have a hierarchy consisting of three layers, the
principal should provide both the agent and the supervisor the correct incentives to
perform. But employment of a supervisor creates another problem, the possibility of
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collusion. For example, the supervisor can accept a bribe from the agent and misreport.
This is one type of collusive behaviours and it can take many other forms in the organ-
isation. Public officials accepting bribes (colluding with clients) to give unjust permits
can illustrate a collusion in the government hierarchies. If the incentive mechanisms
are not properly designed, corruption can happen and, sometimes, produce disastrous
consequences for the organization.1
The main contribution of this thesis lies in introducing new sets of collusion con-
straints to evaluate their impacts on the design of incentives in hierarchies, under moral
hazard. Collusion can be defined as a bilateral, hidden arrangement involving trans-
fers, whereby a coalition in the hierarchy (group of members) forms an agreement to
undertake specific actions so as to raise its members’ joint and individual benefits. In
the typical three-layer hierarchy model, these coalitions consist of two parties.
As all agreements, collusion must be enforceable. All static models assume that
collusion can be enforced, some with a cost, some without a cost. But the mechanism
through which the parties can enforce collusion, how the parties prevent each other’s
deviation from the side contract, is left unmodelled. In this thesis we adopt the same
approach. In our static model, side-contracting (collusion) occurs whenever the parties’
total utility is larger than without side-contracting.2
The new set of collusion constraints introduced in this thesis is “ex-ante” in the
sense that the opportunity to collude arises before the parties engage in their assigned
tasks, as opposed to the standard (ex-post) opportunity to collude after the tasks are
complete but before the contracts are executed (such as, suppression of information in
a report used in determination of wages to be paid). The questions we study and a
summary of our results are in order below.
First, since we have now two different types of collusion, relationship between them
has to be examined. We ask whether preventing one type of collusion, automatically
prevents the other one. Characterization of full collusion proof contracts show that
none of the collusion constraints can be ignored, depending on the parameter values,
either one of the four collusion constraints (ex-ante downward, ex-ante upward, ex-post
downward, ex-post upward) can be binding.
1Although not synonymous, corruption is a form of collusion. We care about corruption since it
leads to eradication of confidence in the society. If an officer in the judicial system gets involved in
corruption, it may ultimately result in collapse of the system. Also, corruption reduces the reliability
and prestige of the country. As a direct result of this, foreign capital flow into the country may decrease
which can put pressure on economy.
2In real-world cases, various mechanisms are available to enforce collusion, essentially based on
repetitive encounters between the colluding parties such as reciprocity and and face-to-face relations.
In these environments, mutual credible threats for deviations, if available, can serve to enforce collusion.
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Secondly, having included the ex-ante collusion proofness constraints into the prin-
cipal’s problem, we observe that the supervisor’s incentive compatibility constraint is
automatically satisfied. This does not hold if one ignores the ex-ante collusions are
ignored. Specifically, preventing ex-ante downward collusion as a by-product ensures
that the supervisor has the incentive to monitor the agent. In other words, the principal
does not have to worry about getting the supervisor monitor the agent if the contracts
are full-collusion-proof.
We also ask if preventing ex-ante collusion possibilities have any effect on the princi-
pal’s expected costs. To find the answer, we solve the principal’s problem without and
with ex-ante collusion constraints. Our results show that, there is a raise in expected
costs which for some specific parameters, is doubled. Obviously this is not good news
for the principal; now, higher wages must be paid to prevent all types of collusion. This
leads us to another question, as to whether the rise in the expected costs to prevent all
collusion is financially justifiable, an issue which we tackle next.
We observe that in this hierarchical environment, the principal has four possible
strategies in designing contracts: preventing all types of collusion, permitting ex-post
downward collusion, permitting ex-post upward collusion and permitting both ex-post
collusions. Ex-ante collusions must be prevented at any cost because the principal’s
objective is to induce high effort (as if high output is infinitely valued). We solve
for optimal contracts under each remaining strategy and show that despite of raise in
expected costs, preventing all types of collusion is the weakly optimal strategy for the
principal.
Lastly, we define an alternative monitoring system, input monitoring, where the
supervisor monitors the effort level of the agent instead of the output the agent produces.
The monitoring technology (specifically, the probability of obtaining hard evidence and
the cost of monitoring) is identical. We show that input monitoring is structurally
more efficient than output monitoring. The level of output is stochastically related
to effort level. Because the objective is to induce high effort, monitoring effort is
more effective than a variable, like output, that is correlated with it. In more detail,
for input monitoring, all the wages can be reduced if monitoring cost gets smaller.
However, inefficiency of the effort in output monitoring prevents the principal reduce
all the wages proportionally to monitoring cost. If monitoring cost is sufficiently small,
ex-post upward collusion constraint is binding (not the case in input monitoring) so
that wages have to be kept above a certain level.
3
2 Literature Review
The related literature, in the broadest sense, includes models of moral hazard and the
theory of incentives. Organisations are made of nested hierarchies which represent rank-
ing of authorities or flow of information−these topics, though important, are outside
the scope of this thesis. Analyses of incentive mechanisms in vertical hierarchies in the
economics literature are first done in principal-agent models. Those with hidden action
deal with imperfect information after the contracts are written. The agent may choose
an unobservable effort level or the agent learns his effort cost.
Without moral hazard, i.e., when effort is observable and contractible, the design of
optimal contracts is fairly simple since the principal can directly induce the desired effort
level of the agent. Under moral hazard, however, the agent’s action is not observable to
the principal. This raises a problem of designing contracts that offer effort incentives
by relating wage payments to some observable variable that is correlated with the
agent’s effort. When feasible, such contract design will raise the expected wage bill.
Ultimately, under moral hazard, to compensate for costly effort, incentive constraint
has to be satisfied and to induce voluntary participation, participation constraint has to
be satisfied. The contracts that satisfy these two conditions are called incentive feasible
contracts. In this context, these types of contracts are valuable for us since optimal
contract that minimized the cost of implementation should be among these contracts.
In the absence of the supervisor, assuming that the output is observable, the contracts
should be contingent on the level of production. Agent’s wages should increase as the
profit of the principal increases or the output level increases, its functional form can be
linear or non-linear depending on the model.
The idea to include into the model a supervisor to acquire information about agent’s
action as a potential solution for hidden action is formally studies by, first, Tirole (1986).
Tirole models the supervisor as an intermediary player and points out that inclusion
of this third party leads to collusion possibilities in the hierarchy. The supervisor has
her own interests, just like the agent, which opens the door for information manipu-
lation. Since the principal relies on the information that the supervisor acquires, the
agent may simply offer a bribe to the supervisor to reveal favourable information and
conceal unfavourable information. Introduction of the supervisor has thus created a
new collusion and corruption literature, which has expanded since then.
However, because it brings in multiple collusion possibilities that are costly to pre-
vent, the inclusion of the supervisor into the hierarchy needs to be justified, financially.
Initially, the supervisor was justified by the assumption that either the principal has no
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time to conduct the supervision or the supervisor is much more efficient in monitoring.
However, its possible economic benefit was analysed after a time. Regarding this issue,
Tirole (1992) compares two and three level hierarchies and conclude standard sufficient
statistics principles for rewarding agents do not hold in the presence of collusion. Thus,
threat of collusion may get ahead of benefit of supervisor. Baliga (1999) proposes a new
method to make use of the supervisor. If the supervisor and the agent himself gives
a report about the type of the agent to the principal at the same; and the agent paid
is lower if the reports do not match, comparison of the optimal contracts justifies the
economic benefit of the supervisor.
Strausz (1997) addresses the question of delegation of monitoring directly, compar-
ing two strategies for the principal within a canonical hierarchy set-up which includes
hidden action. The first strategy is that the principal hires a supervisor to monitor
the agent, the second is that he conducts the monitoring himself. The monitoring
technology is the same under both strategies and the analysis focuses on the costs of
incentives provided to agent. He proves that hiring a supervisor and incentivizing the
agent through adjustment of two contracts for two people is easier than doing with
one contract for just the agent. If the principal chooses to monitor himself, the agent
would infer that the principal would not ever reveal a high output evidence. Under the
alternative arrangement, the principal gives incentives to the supervisor to reveal high
output, which relaxes the agent’s incentive constraint.
Recent research in this field utilizes three-level incentive schemes, which create col-
lusion possibilities as we mentioned earlier. In the remainder of this section we focus
on the collusion literature.
There is a considerable literature trying to understand the effects of supervision,
methods to minimize the wage bill while inducing all the desirable actions by the agents.
As mentioned, the new aspect in this thesis is introduction of collusion possibilities
before the members of an organization undertake their respective tasks. For instance, a
police officer and his supervisor can agree to collude ex-ante, share the corrupt proceeds
from the Mafia and in return of a bribe, ignore the activities of the Mafia. To our
knowledge the possibility of ex-ante collusion has by and large been ignored.
Whereas the main focus in the literature is on potential side transfers between the
agent and the supervisor, collusion possibilities between the supervisor and the principal
are also recognized. The only type of collusion admitted in extant models is (what we
call) ex-post collusion. This type of collusion occurs when the supervisor acquires an
information about the agent’s performance and agrees, with one of the other players, to
reveal a different finding. For instance, if the supervisor has evidence justifying the low
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output, the agent has the possibility of approaching to the supervisor, offering a bribe so
as the latter does not reveal the evidence. If the offer is accepted, side transfers happen
and we have collusion. In the absence of these collusion possibilities the principal’s
expected wage bill would be much lower. When collusion possibilities are included,
however, contracts must be adjusted accordingly. Tirole (1986) establishes the basis of
the collusion argument by combining sociology and economics. Collusive behaviour in
the sociology literature has deep roots but economic analysis is recent. His economic
analysis establishes that the possibility of collusive behaviour decreases the efficiency of
hierarchical systems, but as a threat it should be banished by an appropriate incentive
mechanism. He warns, however, that this conclusion is an extreme one and that it
should be assessed cautiously, for there can be a case for beneficial collusion, where side
transfers are required to maintain long-term relationships in any level of the hierarchy.
Kofman and Lawarre´e (1993) study a potential solution to collusion between the
agent and the supervisor. They introduce an external supervisor (called, auditor) whose
main aim is to prevent deviation of the internal supervisor. The external supervisor has
short term contracts, so she can bear much easier than the first one to the pressures
from the organisation so that they assume external supervisor never colludes. This
makes the external supervisor more reliable but she may not be able to know specific
requirements of the job as well. Thus, the benefits from using an external supervisor are
ambiguous. They show that optimal contracts may indeed require randomly assigned
external auditors.
In another paper, Kofman and Lawarre´e (1996) argue the potential benefits of allow-
ing collusion by using a similar canonical model. They assume the auditor can have two
types: dishonest and honest. This information is unknown to the principal, so decision
of allowing or deterring collusion should be made under information asymmetry. They
show that preventing collusion may not be efficient since both dishonest and honest
auditors are rewarded. Also, allowing collusion is costly since dishonest auditors take
advantage of the situation and deters. Thus, depending on the characteristics of the
auditor optimal contracts may change. They show that, if there is a positive probability
of hiring a dishonest auditor, there may be some specific instances where permitting
collusion turns out to be optimal. Moreover, if there are high punishments for low
output, permitting collusion is always the most efficient choice for the principal. Note
that, they also show hiring an auditor when collusion is allowed still efficient since the
manager has to pay bribe to make the auditor reveal a favourable report. There exist
other papers offering solutions to ex-post collusion, analysing the effect of collusion
possibilities on efficiency or beneficial collusions. However, all these papers are limited
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to the case of ex-post collusion.
Ex-ante collusion possibilities are introduced in hierarchy models of moral hazard by
Bac (1996) and later by Bac and Kucuksenel (2005). This kind of collusion occurs when
the supervisor stops monitoring the agent in return of a bribe. In a way, the supervisor
is taken out of the model and there is no chance to produce a report on the agent’s
performance. Since this collusion occurs before not their tasks are done, it is called ex-
ante. Whether there is an actual threat of ex-ante collusion or not was unknown until
recently. Bac and Kucuksenel (2005) extended the Tirole’s (1986) paper by introducing
ex-ante collusion and tried to examine the interaction (if any) between these new ex-
ante type of collusion with ex-post collusion, along with the incentive constraints of
the players in the hierarchy. Their analysis proves that if probability of the detection
is large and monitoring costs are small, ex-post collusion-proof contracts automatically
become ex-ante collusion-proof, so that in those cases ex-ante collusion can be ignored.
Otherwise, ex-ante collusions can be prevented by increasing the wages paid when
there is productive evidence or by decreasing the wages when there is no evidence.
When ex-ante possibilities are taken into account, adjusting wage gaps provides the
required incentives to protect the order in the hierarchy. They also note that, if the
supervisor stops monitoring, ex-post considerations becomes irrelevant as well since
there remains no possibility to deviate to better state for the supervisor ex-post. This
is an important implication coming from the interaction of two types of collusions. The
thesis incorporates some of the findings of this paper and tries to advance the analysis
of ex-ante constraints further.
Though preventing collusion by contract design seems the obvious solution, the costs
can be high. Permitting some types of collusions can help the principal to reduce to
expected costs and can be chosen provided the agent’s incentive to exert high effort
is maintained. Vafai (2018) addresses this issue in a standard three-layer hierarchy
model, with two ex-post collusion possibilities: ex-post downward collusion and ex-
post upward collusion. Ex-post downward collusion occurs when the supervisor finds
low output and the agent bribes the supervisor to deviate to an empty report. It
is sensible to prevent this collusion because otherwise incentivizing high effort by the
agent will be difficult and costly. This is the common type of collusion examined in the
literature. The other, upward collusion “happens when the supervisor finds high output
and is approached by the principal to deviate to empty report.” A priori, this kind of
collusion has an ambiguous impact on effort incentives. Vafai identifies four strategies
for the principal: permitting both types of ex-post collusions, preventing only ex-post
downward collusion, preventing only ex-post upward collusion and preventing both
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types of ex-post collusions. He then proves that the optimal strategy is to prevent all
types of collusions, by comparing the expected costs of these afore mentioned strategies.
He argues that permitting upward collusion increases the expected costs through two
main channels. First, the principal has to pay more to the agent to guarantee that
he exerts high effort (called incentive effect); second, preventing downward corruption
becomes harder, because under upward ex-post collusion the agent knows that he will
never ever be paid the high wage, that is, he will be aware of the fact that his efforts
can at best produce an empty report (called downward corruption effect.)
The basic model in this thesis borrows from Vafai (2018). It extends the collusion
possibilities in the hierarchy and studies input and output monitoring cases separately.
This extension would not have any impact if supervision were costless. Introduction
of a positive monitoring cost for the supervisor, seemingly a minor modification, is
shown to have important implications on the optimal contracts, in particular under the
possibility of ex-ante collusion. Showing this, the thesis proceeds with a comparison of
the principal’s utility (expected wage bill) from from four different strategies consisting
of permitting and preventing ex-post collusion both exclusively and together. It turns
out that preventing all kinds of collusion would be in the best interest of the principal,
if high effort is expected from the agent. Thus, our results agree with Vafai’s findings,
preventing all types of collusion remains as weakly optimal strategy for the principal.
In this way, by considering ex-ante collusion possibilities along with ex-post ones, we
have strengthened this conclusion.
Another subject of research is the comparative analysis of different types of moni-
toring. Among the limited number of contributions, to our knowledge, Khalil (1995) is
the first to analyse the differences and compare the effectiveness of different monitoring
methods. Khalil (1995) uses a principal-agent model where the principal monitors the
agent. He argues that residual claimancy is the source of rent in the hierarchy and the
choice between input and output monitoring is determined according to the identity of
the residual claimant. If the principal is the residual claimant, then input monitoring
is efficient, otherwise output monitoring is preferred.
Zhao (2008) uses a model where the agent has multiple task and the supervisor
monitors the agent. He shows that multi tasks and limited liability constraints make
the output-based incentive system preferable. Rewarding the overall outcome becomes
better option than evaluating piecewise effort level of the agent. He argues that these
results rationalize output-based performance bonuses. Although models in these last
two papers are completely different than ours, they illustrate the large variety of ap-
proaches used in the literature. We also carry out a comparison, output vs. input
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monitoring, in this thesis.
The thesis is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model which
is an extended version of a canonical agent-supervisor-principal model. In section 4, we
introduce ex-ante collusions and analyse their effect on optimal contracts under output
monitoring. In section 5, we check whether permitting ex-post collusions or preventing
any type of collusion is better strategy for the principal. In section 6, we suggest an
alternative monitoring method and conduct its analysis. In section 7, we present some
of the results that are generally coming out of comparison between these two types of
monitoring. Lastly, section 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of results.
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3 The Model
The model is an extension of the canonical agent-supervisor-principal setup introduced
by Tirole (1986) and studied by many others later on. The hierarchy consists of three
members, the agent, the supervisor and the principal. I assume that all parties are risk
neutral and that their outside options are (normalized to) zero.
3.1 Tasks, utilities and contracts
The agent’s task is to exert effort, but his actions are unobservable. He can exert high
effort e = 1 which costs him ce, or exert low effort e = 0, at zero cost. Effort produces
an output according to a stochastic technology: If e = 1, output is high, xH > 0, with
probability pi ∈ (0, 1] and low, xL = 0, with probability 1-pi.
Output, like the agent’s effort, is not directly observable. The supervisor’ task is to
monitor the agent’s output or the effort input, (depending on the case or, choice of the
principal) and submit a report r on the inspection result to the principal. Monitoring
costs cm to the supervisor and generates verifiable (hard) evidence with probability µ
about the target variable, effort or output. With probability 1 − µ monitoring fails,
that is, she obtains no evidence.
The supervisor’s choice of action is also unobservable, which brings in a second
moral hazard issue to solve for the principal. She must find it in her own interest to
monitor the agent and report it to the principal. If the supervisor does not monitor the
agent, she cannot obtain any evidence about the target variable. Hard evidence cannot
be fabricated, but note that it can be concealed.
To illustrate, in the case of output monitoring, if the supervisor chooses to monitor,
she generates hard evidence about output, either xH or xL, with probability µ ∈ (0, 1).
Then, the supervisor’s report r can be of three types, r = xL, r = xH and r = ∅. If she
does not monitor output, the only possible report is r = ∅.
Denoting the agent’s wage by w and the supervisor’s wage by s, final utilities are
UA(w, e) = w − ce for the agent if he exerts effort, UA(w, 0) = w if he does not, and
US(s,m) = s− cm for the supervisor if she monitors, US(s, 0) = s if she does not. The
principal’s objective is to induce the agent to exert high effort at minimum expected
cost.
The sequence of events is shown in Figure 1 below. The principal offers a pair of
contracts CA = {wL, w∅, wH} for the agent and CS = {sL, s∅, sH} for the supervisor,
each specifying a wage pair (wr, sr) for each possible output report r. Following accep-
tance of the contracts but before the supervisor and the agent undertake their respective
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Principal offers
Contracts CA, CS,
accepted
contracts are
executed
Ex-ante
collusion?
Agent chooses
effort, Supervisor
makes inspection
decision
Inspection
outcome realized
Ex-post
collusion?
Supervisor
submits
output
report
Figure 1: The sequence of events in the hierarchy.
tasks, any pair of the three parties can engage in collusion. This kind of side contracting
may occur before effort and monitoring choices, hence the label “ex-ante collusion.” In
the next phase the agent chooses his effort, following which the supervisor decides on
whether to monitor. There is another collusion possibility at this stage, before the su-
pervisor submits her report. Based on the information she obtained, the supervisor can
approach the agent or the principal to jointly raise their final utilities by suppressing
hard output evidence, if any. This kind of side contracting is called “ex-post collusion.”
Finally, the supervisor submits a report, on the basis of which contracts are executed.
We assume that the agent and the supervisor are protected by limited liability, that
is, their wages in each outcome cannot be reduced below a lower bound, which we take
equal to zero.
wL ≥ 0, w∅ ≥ 0, wH ≥ 0, sL ≥ 0, s∅ ≥ 0, sH ≥ 0. (1)
3.2 Collusion possibilities in the hierarchy
Ex-post the supervisor has an informational power (the outcome of output monitoring)
which she can abuse in side contracting with either the agent or the principal, depending
on the hard information she got. She can offer the agent or the principal to suppress
the hard evidence for a transfer, a bribe.
Ex-ante, before even the agent and the supervisor perform their tasks, the motiva-
tion for collusion is completely different. There is scope for beneficial agent-supervisor
side contracts because the two can jointly deviate to shirking and economize on the
costs of their projected actions, effort and monitoring. On the other hand the principal
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can collude with the supervisor against the agent, whereby the supervisor deviates to
shirking for a bribe from the principal and the latter so economizes on the wage bill.
The exact forms of these collusive agreements will be explained in the sequel.
For simplicity, the analysis assumes that all types of collusion are costlessly enforced
and implemented. Thus, the parties will collude whenever their total expected utilities
are larger than without collusion. Obviously this brings and upper bound on the utilities
that the parties can reach via collusion and thus a lower bound on the principal’s utility
from preventing all types of collusion while inducing the agent exert high effort.
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4 Supervisor monitors output
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, as a benchmark we study the optimal con-
tracts without (hence, ignoring) the ex-ante collusion possibilities. The second part will
incorporate the ex-ante collusion proofness constraints and highlight their impact on
both the optimal contracts and the principal’s expected wage bill.
4.1 Optimal ex-post collusion-proof contracts
This subsection states the parties’ expected utilities, derives the incentive compatibility
constraints and the optimal contracts CA and CS that are ex-post collusion-proof.
Assume that the supervisor monitors output. The agent’s incentive compatibility
constraint when ex-post collusion does not occur is
µ[piwH + (1− pi)wL] + (1− µ)w∅ − ce ≥ µwL + (1− µ)w∅.
The left hand side is the agent’s utility when he exerts effort and the right hand
side is the utility from shirking (note that the supervisor may not be able to generate
hard evidence about the output, even though output is low). This constraint can be
simplified as
wH − wL ≥ ce
µpi
. (2)
Thus, to motivate the agent the contract must set at least a difference of ce
µpi
between
the agent’s wages under high and low output reports.
The supervisor must be induced to monitor the agent, for otherwise the only possible
output report is r = ∅ and hence the agent has no incentive to exert effort. Assume
that the agent exerts high effort and the contracts are ex-post collusion-proof, the
supervisor’s incentive compatibility constraint is
µ[pisH + (1− pi)sL] + (1− µ)s∅ − cm ≥ s∅.
With probability µ monitoring is successful and the supervisor’s expected wage is pisH+
(1−pi)sL, while with probability 1−µ monitoring fails and his wage is s∅. Thus the left
hand side is the expected utility of the supervisor when she monitors and the right hand
side is the utility from not monitoring, which is simply s∅. The supervisor’s incentive
compatibility constraint simplifies to
µ[pisH + (1− pi)sL] ≥ µs∅ + cm. (3)
13
It is easy to see that the limited liability constraints in (1) imply that the contract
automatically satisfies the participation constraints of the agent and the supervisor.3
Consider now the two collusion possibilities, ex-post. First, if the supervisor obtains
low output evidence, the agent can offer a bribe to the supervisor so that the latter
submits the report r = ∅ instead of r = xL. Under an empty report, the total utility of
the agent the supervisor is s∅ +w∅. Assuming that the supervisor does not participate
in collusion when he is indifferent, ex-post downward collusion is prevented if
sL + wL ≥ s∅ + w∅. (4)
Second, when the supervisor obtains high output evidence, she may collude with the
principal who would offer a bribe to the supervisor to withhold the information and
report r = ∅ instead of r = xH . Because the supervisor’s wages are direct costs for the
principal, the surplus from this type of collusion depends solely on the agent’s wages.4
Ex-post upward collusion cannot occur if the agent’s wage under r = ∅ is at least as
large as his wage under r = xH :
w∅ ≥ wH . (5)
When (4) and (5) hold so that the hierarchy is protected against downward ex-post
and upward ex-post collusion, the principal’s expected wage cost EC can be written as
min
wL,w∅,wH ,sL,s∅,sH
µ[pi(wH + sH) + (1− pi)(wL + sL)] + (1− µ)(w∅ + s∅)
subject to (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5)
The solution to this problem is stated and explained below.
Proposition 1 Suppose that ex-ante collusions are not possible. The optimal ex-post
collusion-proof contract and the principal’s corresponding expected cost of inducing high
effort are:
(i) (wXL , w
X
∅ , w
X
H ) = (0,
ce
µpi
, ce
µpi
), (sXL , s
X
∅ , s
X
H) = (
ce
µpi
, 0, 0) and ECX = ce
µpi
if (1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm;
(ii) (wXL , w
X
∅ , w
X
H ) = (0,
ce
µpi
, ce
µpi
), (sXL , s
X
∅ , s
X
H) = (σL, 0, σH) such that µ[piσH + (1 −
pi)σL] = cm satisfying σL ≥ ceµpi and ECX = cm + ce (1−µ+µpi)µpi , if (1−pi)pi ce ≤ cm.
Thus, the agent is paid a bonus to cover his effort cost in the two possible outputs
3The participation constraints are µ[piwH + (1−pi)wL] + (1−µ)w∅− ce ≥ 0 for the agent, µ[pisH +
(1− pi)sL] + (1− µ)s∅ − cm ≥ 0 for the supervisor.
4Stated differently, the principal can at most offer the supervisor the bribe b = wH −w∅+ sH − s∅
for reporting r = ∅ instead of r = xH , which the supervisor would accept if b is larger than the wage
sH she gets by reporting r = xH . Thus collusion will not happen if sH ≥ s∅ + (wH − w∅ + sH − s∅)
which yields the collusion-proofness constraint above.
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xH and ∅ under high effort. The zero wage paid under hard evidence of low output
keeps the agent on the high effort track, at minimum cost. As for the supervisor’s
optimal contract, Proposition 1 distinguishes between two cases. If the monitoring cost
of the supervisor is below a threshold (1−pi)
pi
ce, we are in case (i): Supervisor’s incentive
compatibility constraint becomes redundant, hence she is only paid when the output is
low and that is the minimum amount that satisfies (4).
If cm ≥ (1−pi)pi ce that is case (ii): The principal has no choice but to increase low
or high output wages of supervisor to satisfy her incentive compatibility constraint
and ensure that she monitors the agent. Otherwise, the supervisor will deviate and
stop monitoring. Thus, sL and sH must each be non-negative and satisfy µ[pisH +
(1 − pi)sL] = cm. Increasing these wages further is not optimal, so that we set this
specific combination of sL and sH equal to cm. Also, sL has to be at least
ce
µpi
to satisfy
(4). Below this level, downward corruption occurs. Any combination of these wages
satisfying these two specifications will be optimal for the principal.5 Another thing that
should be noted that, this threshold depends on effort cost of agent and pi value. If ce
is higher or pi is smaller then, it is more likely that cm will not bind since increase in
those constraints lead to higher sL wage.
4.2 Optimal full collusion-proof contracts
Both exerting effort and monitoring are costly activities. Thus, their utilities decrease
if they complete their tasks. The agent can approach to the supervisor and propose
not to realize their tasks jointly in return of a bribe. Note that, if there is no extra
bribe, supervisor already may choose not to monitor. This type of side contracting is
called ex-ante downward collusion. There is also ex-ante upward collusion possibility
between the principal and the supervisor. The principal bribes her with the surplus
that will come from agent’s expected and realized wage due to worse report. In the
following subsections, we introduce these two new constraints and show their effects on
the optimal contracts if there are any.
4.2.1 Ex-ante downward and ex-ante upward protected contracts
We begin by generating the ex-ante constraints. Agent and supervisor can make agree-
ment before supervisor monitors and agent puts effort meaning that they can simulta-
neously set e=0 and m=0. This type of collusion is called ex-ante downward collusion.
5More precisely, when sL is minimal and equal to
ce
µpi the principal sets sH =
cm
µpi− (1−pi)pi ceµpi , whereas
if sH = 0 then sL is maximal and equal to
cm
µ(1−pi) .
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In this case, if there is surplus compared to the their normal expected utilities, cor-
ruption occurs. Therefore, total expected utilities of the agent and the supervisor from
trustworthy reposting, µ[pisH + (1 − pi)sL] + (1 − µ)s∅ − cm + µ[piwH + (1 − pi)wL] +
(1 − µ)w∅ − ce, should exceed the total utility of the agent and the supervisor when
they engage in corruption that is s∅ + w∅. Then, the institution will not be vulnerable
to ex-ante downward collusion. altogether, ex-ante downward collusion constraint is
µ[pisH + (1− pi)sL] + (1− µ)s∅ − cm + µ[piwH + (1− pi)wL] + (1− µ)w∅ − ce ≥ s∅ + w∅
which is simplified as
µ[pisH + (1− pi)sL] + µ[piwH + (1− pi)wL] ≥ µs∅ + µw∅ + cm + ce (6)
By including this constraint principal make sure that agent and supervisor at least
will not engage in corruption before they do their duties. Next, we check whether this
constraint has an effect on wages for both parties. To achieve this principal solves the
minimization problem in 4.1 with additional constraint (6). As we ignored both ex-ante
constraints for ex-post collusion-proof contracts, we do not consider the ex-ante upward
collusion for now. It helps us to see the isolated effect of ex-ante downward constraint
and also if we permit ex-ante upward collusion, the agent does not exert effort which
is not desired.
Moreover, after principal offers contracts, he can directly try to bribe the supervisor
for not monitoring the agent which results in ex-ante upward collusion. With the same
logic, total expected utilities of the supervisor and the principal when the supervisor
actually monitors should be bigger than total expected utilities they can achieve by
collusion. Since principals is paying for the wages, its expected cost should be written
negatively. In normal monitoring case, principal’s expected cost is µ[pi(wH + sH) + (1−
pi)(wL+ sL)] + (1−µ)(w∅+ s∅) and supervisor’s expected utility is µ[pisH + (1−pi)sL] +
(1−µ)(s∅)−cm. If they agree to collude, supervisor earns s∅ and principal pays s∅+w∅.
Therefore, upward ex-ante collusion constraint is µ[pisH + (1 − pi)sL] + (1 − µ)(s∅) −
cm − (µ[pi(wH + sH) + (1− pi)(wL + sL)] + (1− µ)(w∅ + s∅)) ≥ s∅ − (s∅ + w∅) that can
be simplified as
w∅ ≥ cm
µ
+ [piwH + (1− pi)wL] (7)
This new constraint brings in a restriction on agent’s wages by introducing a lower
bound on w∅. If w∅ is below the threshold given by the expression at the right hand
side of (7), there would be a positive surplus from collusion between the supervisor and
the principal. Note that the lower bound on w∅ depends on cm because under collusion
the principal would economize from wages to the supervisor who does not, accordingly,
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monitor. By adding (7) constraint into the objective function of the principal in 4.1,
we will acquire optimal contract that accounts for ex-ante upward collusion.
Proposition 2
a. The optimal ex-post collusion-proof and ex-ante downward collusion-proof con-
tract (assuming ex-ante upward collusion is not possible) and the principal’s correspond-
ing expected cost of inducing high effort are:
(wDL , w
D
∅ , w
D
H) = (0,
ce
µpi
, ce
µpi
), (sDL , s
D
∅ , s
D
H) = (σL, 0, σH) such that µ[piσH + (1 − pi)σL] =
cm +
ce
pi
satisfying σL ≥ ceµpi and ECD = cm + ce (1+µpi)µpi .
b. The optimal ex-post collusion-proof and ex-ante upward collusion-proof contract
(assuming ex-ante downward collusion is not possible) and the principal’s corresponding
expected cost of inducing high effort are:
(i) (wUL , w
U
∅ , w
U
H) = (0,
ce
µpi
, ce
µpi
), (sUL , s
U
∅ , s
U
H) = (
ce
µpi
, 0, 0) and ECU = ce
µpi
if (1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm;
(ii) (wUL , w
U
∅ , w
U
H) = (0,
cm+ce
µ
, ce
µpi
), (sUL , s
U
∅ , s
U
H) = (σL, 0, σH) such that µ[piσH + (1 −
pi)σL] = cm satisfying sL ≥ cm+ceµ and ECU = cm+ceµ , if (1−pi)pi ce ≤ cm.
Observe that introducing the ex-ante downward collusion constraint on top of ex-
post collusion constraints did not have any effect on agent’s wages. However, it sup-
pressed supervisor’s IC constraint and lead to an increase in supervisor’s wages. With-
out any condition on cm any other variable, this ex-ante constraint binds. To prevent
ex-ante downward collusion we need to increase either sL or sH even further than the
amount required to give supervisor monitoring incentive. While keeping sL above
ce
µpi
to satisfy (4), any combination of these wages satisfying µ[piσH + (1− pi)σL] = cm + cepi
will be optimal for the principal.6
Even if it is compared to the worse case of ex-post protected institution that is (ii)
stated in proposition 1, there is an increase of ce
pi
in expected cost for the principal.
From this result, we conclude that, there is indeed a downward collusion possibility
just after the contracts are proposed, so that, principal should take this threat into
account while designing contracts.
For the contracts preventing ex-ante upward collusion, there are two distinguishing
cases similar to the ex-post collusion-proof case. Condition for these cases are exactly
the same but the contracts have differences. If cm is below
(1−pi)
pi
ce, then the contracts
are same since ex-ante upward constraint does not bind and it has no effect. However,
if cm ≥ (1−pi)pi ce then principal need to increase w∅ to prevent the collusion. Increasing
6Specifically, when sL is minimal and equal to
ce
µpi the principal sets sH =
cm
µpi − (1−µ−pi)µpi ceµpi , whereas
if sH = 0 then sL is maximal and equal to
picm+ce
µpi(1−pi) .
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w∅ also increases the lower bound for sL to satisfy ex-post downward collusion con-
straint. In this case, lower bound for sL becomes
cm+ce
µ
. It should be noted that, in this
condition, supervisor’s IC constraint always binds and the principal needs to increase
sL and sH to give enough incentive to supervisor to monitor.
7
Principal still set sL and sH combination to cm. Therefore, there is no additional
cost from there. On the other hand, to prevent this ex-ante upward collusion, there
should be increase in w∅. Depending on the amount that cm exceeds
(1−pi)
pi
ce, w∅ has to
be increased. At the end, this will result in increase in expected cost.
Until now, we have shown that both ex-ante constraints should be considered while
contracts are designed. They are not implied by other constraints and there are actual
collusion possibilities. In the next step, we will look for the optimal contracts that
prevents all collusion threats.
4.2.2 Fully protected contracts
When the contract is full collusion-proof, none of the players in this hierarchy can
benefit from bribing another. They will fulfil their duties: the agent will set e = 1 and
the supervisor will monitor, m = 1. To achieve this outcome at minimum expected
cost, the principal must solve the following problem:
min
wL,w∅,wH ,sL,s∅,sH
µ[pi(wH + sH) + (1− pi)(wL + sL)] + (1− µ)(w∅ + s∅)
subject to (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7)
Proposition 3 The optimal full collusion-proof contract and the principal’s correspond-
ing expected cost of inducing high effort are:
(i) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, ceµpi ,
ce
µpi
), (sL, s∅, sH) = (σL, 0, σH) such that µ[piσH + (1− pi)σL] =
cm +
ce
pi
satisfying sL ≥ ceµpi and EC = cm + ce (1+µpi)µpi if (1−pi)pi ce ≥ cm;
(ii) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, cm+ceµ ,
ce
µpi
), (sL, s∅, sH) = (σL, 0, σH) such that µ[piσH + (1 −
pi)σL] = 2cm + ce satisfying sL ≥ cm+ceµ and EC = cm (1+µ)µ + ce (1+µ)µ if (1−pi)pi ce ≤ cm.
There is a significant change in the wage structure compared to the ex-post collusion-
proof contracts given in proposition 1. Both propositions 1 and 3 have two distinguish-
ing cases and condition for these cases are same. For case (i), agent’s wages do not
change, but now combination of wages sL and sH should increase to claim full collusion-
7In detail, when sL is minimal and equal to
cm+ce
µ the principal sets sH =
cm
µ − (1−pi)µpi , whereas if
sH = 0 then sL is maximal and equal to
cm
µ(1−pi) .
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proofness. Constraint on sL does not change.
8 For case (ii), there is an increase in w∅
to prevent ex-ante upward collusion. Also, due to increase in the agent’s wages, the
supervisor’s wages further increases.9 Note that, expected cost for the principal also
increases due to wage increases.
For both cases, the principal increases the combination of sL and sH wages above
cm to satisfy the ex-ante downward collusion constraint. Therefore, supervisor’s IC is
automatically satisfied. Both ex-post upward and ex-ante upward constraints put a
restriction on w∅. Two constraints cannot bind at the same time, depending on ce and
cm, binding constraint changes. If the supervision cost cm is very low, ex-post upward
constraint binds so that preventing ex-post upward collusion prevents ex-ante upward
collusion threat as well. On the other hand, if cm is higher than
(1−pi)
pi
ce, preventing
ex-ante upward collusion becomes more costly since the principal needs to pay premium
to prevent possibility of collusion between himself and the principal to induce agent to
put effort.
Moreover, the ex-post collusion constraints are always binding. The ex-post down-
ward collusion constraint puts a lower bound on sL whereas the ex-ante downward
collusion constraint imposes a restriction on some combination of sL and sH . In total,
when the supervisor conducts output monitoring, supervisor’s IC and, depending on ce
and cm, one of the upward collusion constraints becomes redundant.
8When sL is minimal and equal to
ce
µpi the principal sets
cm
µpi − (1−µ−pi)µpi ceµpi , whereas if sH = 0 then
sL is maximal and equal to
picm+ce
µpi(1−pi) .
9When sL is minimal and equal to
cm+ce
µ the principal sets sH =
(1+pi)cm+pice
µpi , whereas if sH = 0
then sL is maximal and equal to
2cm+ce
µ(1−pi) .
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5 Should the principal prevent ex-post collusion?
After showing that the full collusion-proof contracts have significantly higher expected
costs for the principal, we know look for the best strategy for principal to minimize
this cost while inducing agent to put effort. The principal has to prevent both ex-ante
collusions at any cost since high output has infinite value for the principal and only way
to produce output is that the agent actually works. On the other hand, the principal
can decide on whether ex-post collusion should be prevented or not. There exist four
strategies which can be used: preventing both downward and upward collusion, per-
mitting downward collusion, permitting upward collusion and permitting both types of
collusions. Vafai showed that in the absence of ex-ante collusion, best strategy would
be to prevent all ex-post collusions and offer a full collusion-proof contract. We know
check whether his claim can be extended when ex-ante collusions are introduced to the
hierarchy. To find out the answer of this question, we need to know the expected costs
in each case. We already have optimal contracts for full collusion-proof case that is pre-
venting both ex-post collusions strategy at the end of the previous chapter. We solve
the principal’s problem for remaining three other strategies and compare the results.
5.1 Permit downward ex-post collusion
All the constraints discussed in the previous sections are subject to change except for
limited liabilities (1). When we allow for any type of ex-post collusion, parties will be
aware of the situation and their incentive constraints will change. When the supervisor
finds low output, the agent can offer bribe up to bDC = w∅ − wL to the supervisor,
make him reveal empty output. Since we assumed the supervisor does not engage in
corruption when indifferent, bribe should be strictly positive and as small as possible.
w∅ − wL ≥ k. (8)
Note that, in this constraint k ≥ 0 and k → 0.
We wanted to permit downward ex-post collusion which requires sL<s∅+(w∅−wL).
To get rid of strict inequality we use the surplus coming from bribe, and the constraint
becomes
sL ≤ s∅ + (w∅ − wL − k). (9)
We still prevent upward ex-post collusion. Thus, we borrow this constraint directly
(5).
We need to redefine incentive compatibility constraints and ex-ante collusion-proofness
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constraints. Agent now gives a bribe to the supervisor if she finds a low output. We can
write agent’s IC as µ[piwH+(1−pi)(w∅−bDC)]+(1−µ)w∅−ce ≥ µ(w∅−bDC)+(1−µ)w∅.
Since the agent offers all the surplus that will come from deviation to the empty report,
his incentive constraint will be same as it is in the full collusion proof case that is
wH − wL ≥ ce
µpi
. (10)
Since the agent has to offer all the surplus coming from difference between the empty
report wage and low output wage, his incentives do not change when ex-post downward
collusion is permitted.
Supervisor will accept the bribe, when she finds low output, she will get s∅ + bDC
instead of sL. In total supervisor’s IC is µ[pisH + (1− pi)(semptyset+w∅−wL)] + (1−
µ)s∅ − cm ≥ s∅. Simplification yields
µpisH + w∅(µ− µpi) ≥ cm + wL(µ− µpi) + µpis∅. (11)
Notice that her incentive does not include sL wage anymore since it will be already
offered as bribe if she can find a proof of low output.
We are done with ex-post collusion constraint and incentive compatibility con-
straints. Now, we need to write down ex-ante collusion-proofness constraints and min-
imize the expected cost of the principal in this environment.
Ex-ante downward collusion constraint is µ[pisH +(1−pi)(s∅+w∅−wL]+(1−µ)s∅−
cm + µ[pisH + (1− pi)wL] + (1− µ)w∅ − ce ≥ s∅ + w∅. Simplified version is
µpiwH + µpisH ≥ cm + ce + µpis∅ + µpiw∅. (12)
When ex-post downward collusion is permitted, increasing low output wages does
not help us to prevent ex-ante downward collusion as it was in the full-collusion proof
case.
Ex-ante upward collusion-proofness constraint is µ[pisH + (1− pi)(s∅ + w∅ − wL)] +
(1−µ)(s∅)−cm−(µ[pi(w∅+s∅+wH+sH−w∅−s∅)+(1−pi)(w∅+s∅)]+(1−µ)(w∅+s∅)) ≥
s∅ − (s∅ + w∅). It can be simplified as
w∅ ≥ cm
µ
+ [piwH + (1− pi)wL]. (13)
This constraint also did not change when we permit ex-post downward collusion.
Below we produce the objective function of the principal in this environment. The
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solution to this problem will deliver us the optimal contracts that only allow ex-post
downward collusion; all other collusion possibilities are prevented.
min
wL,w∅,wH ,sL,s∅,sH
µpi(wH + sH) + (1− µpi)(w∅ + s∅)
subject to (1), (8), (9), (5), (10), (11), (12) and (13)
Proposition 4 Ignore the possibility of downward ex-post collusion. The optimal ex-
ante collusion-proof contract and the principal’s corresponding expected cost of inducing
high effort are:
(i) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, ceµpi ,
ce
µpi
), (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0, cm+ceµpi ) and EC = cm + ce
(1+µpi)
µpi
if
(1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm;
(ii) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, cm+ceµ ,
ce
µpi
), (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0, cm
(1+pi)
µpi
+ ce
µ
) and EC = cm
(1+µ)
µ
+
ce
1+µ
µ
if (1−pi)
pi
ce ≤ cm.
In the case of full collusion proof implementation, the principal expects to pay w∅
with probability (1−µ). When ex-post downward collusion is permitted, this probability
increases to (1− µpi), because the principal knows that low output will be reported as
an empty report. In view of this fact, the probability of paying low output wages is
zero. Also, weight of sH and wH in the expected cost function of the principal do not
change because there is no upward collusion.
However, these changes have no impact on expected costs. The principal adjusts all
the wages according to the new revealing likelihoods of each type of reports and satisfy
all constraints except the ex-post downward collusion constraint. To prevent ex-ante
downward collusion, the principal was offering a combination of sL and sH wages; now
he offers only sH . Also, as weights of wages in expected cost changed and since w∅ is
more likely to be paid in this case, effect of sH in expected cost will be lower compared
to combination of sL and sH in full collusion-proof case.
In sum, the possibility of a low output report is taken out of the equation, so, the
principal offers sH instead of sL, which does not bring in any extra cost because the
parties are allowed to collude ex-post. In other words, the principal successfully induces
the agent to exert effort and downward collusion, which means that side transfers
between these two parties cancel out from the principal’s cost objective.
5.2 Permit upward ex-post collusion
We will redefine the constraints which guarantee upward ex-post collusion. If the su-
pervisor reveals high output, the principal approaches to the supervisor and offers a
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bribe to change the high output report to the empty report. Maximum amount of bribe
that can be offered is bUC = wH + sH − w∅ − s∅. Using a similar logic, we write the
following constraint. As defined, k ≥ 0 and k → 0.
wH + sH − w∅ − s∅ ≥ k (14)
We wanted to permit upward collusion, so related constraint, ex-post upward col-
lusion constraint, should be inverted. By doing this, we make sure that the supervisor
and the principal benefit from upward collusion.
wH ≥ w∅ + k. (15)
We need to prevent upward ex-post collusion. Related constraint (5) has been
already defined at the beginning of the previous chapter, we directly use it without any
modification.
Agent’s IC will be µ[piw∅ + (1− pi)wL] + (1− µ)w∅ − ce ≥ µwL + (1− µ)w∅. After
simplification,
w∅ − wL ≥ ce
µpi
. (16)
When ex-post upward collusion is allowed, the agent will know that the supervisor
does not reveal high output even though she obtains hard evidence of high output,
because she will collude with the principal. The report will be empty. As a result, the
agent’s incentive to exert high effort now depends on the wage difference between w∅
and wL instead of wH and wL.
Supervisor’s IC is µ[pi(s∅ + wH + sH − w∅ − s∅) + (1− pi)sL] + (1− µ)s∅ − cm ≥ s∅
which is simplified as
µpisH + sL(µ− µpi) + µpiwH ≥ cm + µpiw∅ + µs∅. (17)
Now, wH appears in the LHS of the supervisor’s IC constraint because in the case
of ex-post upward collusion the supervisor takes her bribe from this wage of the agent.
Ex-ante downward collusion constraint is µ[pi(s∅+wH +sH−w∅−s∅)+(1−pi)sL]+
(1− µ)s∅ − cm + µ[piw∅ + (1− pi)wL] + (1− µ)w∅ − ce ≥ s∅ + w∅ and that is
µ[pisH + (1− pi)sL] + µ[piwH + (1− pi)wL] ≥ µs∅ + µw∅ + cm + ce. (18)
This constraint does not change when we allow for upward ex-post collusion.
Lastly, ex-ante upward collusion constraint is µ[pi(s∅ + wH + sH − w∅ − s∅) + (1 −
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pi)(sL)] + (1− µ)(s∅)− cm − (µ[pi(w∅ + s∅ + wH + sH − w∅ − s∅) + (1− pi)(wL + sL)] +
(1− µ)(w∅ + s∅)) ≥ s∅ − (s∅ + w∅).
w∅ ≥ cm
(µ− µpi) + wL. (19)
We do not have wH at the RHS when ex-post upward collusion is permitted because
the supervisor already achieves to get wH − w∅ ex-post.
min
wL,w∅,wH ,sL,s∅,sH
µ[pi(wH + sH) + (1− pi)(wL + sL)] + (1− µ)(w∅ + s∅)
subject to (1), (14), (15), (4), (16), (17), (18) and (19)
Since the principal offers all the surplus as bribe, the objective function does not
change.
Proposition 5 Ignore the possibility of upward ex-post collusion. The optimal ex-ante
collusion-proof contract and the principal’s corresponding expected cost of inducing high
effort are:
(i) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, ceµpi , σa), (sL, s∅, sH) = (σb, 0, σc) such that µpiσa + (µ − µpi)σb +
µpiσc = cm + ce +
ce
pi
satisfying σa ≥ ceµpi + k, σb ≥ ceµpi and EC = cm + ce (1+µpi)µpi if
(1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm;
(ii) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, cm(µ−µpi) , σa), (sL, s∅, sH) = (σb, 0, σc) such that µpiσa+(µ−µpi)σb+
µpiσc = cm + ce +
cm
1−pi satisfying σa ≥ cmµ−µpi + k, σb ≥ cmµ−µpi and EC = cm + ce + cmµ−µpi if
(1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm.
The objective function of the principal is exactly the same as in the case of full
collusion-proof implementation because under ex-post upward collusion, the principal
has to offer as bribe the whole surplus from an empty report instead of the surplus from
a high output report. Thus, the principal will consider high output report wages while
calcullating expected costs which results in same objective function as in full collusion
proof case.
While we analyse this proposition, we need to differentiate between two cases de-
pending on effort cost, monitoring cost and inefficiency parameter of the effort. We can
directly mention each cases through only monitoring cost since it makes sense to con-
duct analysis over supervisor’s incentives. Thus, in case (i) we have very low monitoring
cost, in other case we have high monitoring costs.
For case (i), we have same expected costs, permitting ex-post upward collusion does
not result in any problem for the principal if the monitoring cost is low enough. For
full collusion proof case, wH was giving incentive to the agent not to engage in ex-ante
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downward collusion, now it gives incentive to the supervisor. However, in total, ex-
ante downward collusion constraint is satisfied without harming the principal. Only
the agent is harmed, and some expected income is transferred to the supervisor. The
principal remains unaffected.
The critical point is that the ex-ante upward collusion constraint is automatically
satisfied under a low monitoring cost, so that the effect of this constraint on w∅ can
be ignored. While the principal can satisfy the agent’s IC by increasing the difference
between w∅ and wL, he also prevents ex-ante collusion between the supervisor and the
principal. In other words, when the supervisor faces low monitoring costs, she would
find it beneficial to obtain an evidence first and then expect to be approached by the
principal for collusion.
For case (ii) where the monitoring costs are high, expected costs are high, so,
permitting ex-post upward collusion is not a good strategy for the principal.
Overall, for first case, we end up with same expected costs but for second case,
permitting ex-post collusions is more costly for the principal. Difference between these
two cases emerges solely due to resulting ex-ante upward collusion constraints. When
ex-post upward collusion is prevented, ex-ante upward collusion is adjusted accordingly
and it does not include wH in RHS anymore. As a result of this w∅ does only depend
on cm instead of combination of cm and ce. Specifically,
ce
µ
term in w∅ was due to wH
but permitting ex-post upward collusion has taken wH out of the equation.
Since in case (ii), we have high monitoring cost and ex-post upward collusion per-
mitted contracts puts more weight on cm in w∅, one unit increment of cm costs more to
the principal if ex-post upward collusion is permitted. In other words, now, more w∅
has to be offered to give enough incentive to the supervisor for monitoring, otherwise,
ex-ante upward collusion occurs.
5.3 Permit both ex-post collusions
Now we can borrow positive bribe constraints (8), (14) necessary to deviate the su-
pervisor since she does not engage in collusion when indifferent and inducing ex-post
collusion constraints (9), (15) but we still need redefine incentive and ex-ante collusion
constraints.
In this environment, agent’s IC is µ[piw∅+(1−pi)(w∅−bDC)]+(1−µ)w∅−ce ≥ µ(w∅−
bDC) + (1 − µ)w∅. When the true output is high, the agent earns empty output wage
which is a loss for the agent but he may also compensate this loss if the output is low
by bribing the supervisor. Incorporate bDC and simplify, agent’s incentive compatibility
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constraint is
w∅ − wL ≥ ce
µpi
. (20)
Supervisor will benefit from both collusions since he holds the information which is
power in this context due to information asymmetry. Her incentive constraint without
simplification is µ[pi(s∅+wH+sH−w∅−s∅)+(1−pi)(s∅+w∅−wL)]+(1−µ)s∅−cm ≥ s∅.
Cancel out terms, and group the same wages, we have
µpisH + µpiwH ≥ µpis∅ + cm + wL(µ− µpi) + w∅(2µpi − µ). (21)
In full collusion proof case, the supervisor’s incentive was depending on sL and sH
wages. She was motivated to find an evidence for the agent’s output. However, once
ex-post collusion possibilities are allowed, sL did not mean anything to the supervisor
because nevertheless she will achieve s∅ plus a bribe by colluding with the agent. Other
than this, now she will consider the bribe wH −w∅ that will be offered by the principal
to reveal empty report instead of high output report in her expected utility. When
upward collusion occurs, she takes this bribe but she does not give up sH − s∅; this will
be offered in addition to the bribe. In total, sH and wH become the main determinant
for the supervisor’s motivation.
Furthermore, ex-ante collusion constraints change, because both types of ex-post
collusion are induced, which will be reflected in the parties’ expected utilities. When
the agent puts effort and the supervisor monitors, their total utility will be µ[pi(s∅ +
wH + sH −w∅ − s∅) + (1− pi)(s∅ +w∅ −wL)] + (1− µ)s∅ − cm + µ[piw∅ + (1− pi)(w∅ −
w∅ + wL)] + (1 − µ)w∅ − ce. We adjusted expected wages with given bribes according
to deviations to corrupted output states. This expected utility should be bigger than
ex-ante downward collusion pay-offs. RHS of the equation is same, if they agree to
collude ex-ante, they get s∅ + w∅. Simplifying results in
µpisH + µpiwH ≥ cm + ce + µpiw∅ + µpis∅. (22)
Lastly, we construct ex-ante upward collusion constraint. We want a state where
the principal and the supervisor are not better off when they collude before the agent
and the supervisor do their respective tasks. It happens when µ[pi(s∅+wH + sH −w∅−
s∅) + (1− pi)(s∅ + w∅ − wL)] + (1− µ)s∅ − cm − (µ[pi(w∅ + s∅ + wH + sH − w∅ − s∅) +
(1− pi)(w∅ + s∅)] + (1− µ)(w∅ + s∅)) ≥ s∅ − s∅ − w∅. Simplification gives
w∅ ≥ cm
(µ− µpi) + wL. (23)
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The constraints permitting ex-post collusion are produced. We now solve the prin-
cipal’s adjusted cost minimization problem subject to all of these constraints combined.
Notice that the objective function is the same as in the case of permitting only ex-post
downward collusion. The problem is:
min
wL,w∅,wH ,sL,s∅,sH
µpi(wH + sH) + (1− µpi)(w∅ + s∅)
subject to (1), (8), (9), (14), (15), (20), (21), (22) and (23)
Proposition 6 Ignore the possibility of both ex-post collusions. The optimal ex-ante
collusion-proof contract and the principal’s corresponding expected cost of inducing high
effort are:
(i) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, ceµpi , σw), (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0, σs) such that σw + σs =
cm+2ce
µpi
satisfying σw ≥ ceµpi + k and EC = cm + ce (1+µpi)µpi if (1−pi)pi ce ≥ cm;
(ii) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, cmµ−µpi , σw), (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0, σs) such that σw+σs =
cm
µpi(1−pi)+
ce
µpi
satisfying σw ≥ cmµ−µpi + k and EC = cm + ce + cmµ−µpi if (1−pi)pi ce ≤ cm.
In these contracts, we see the effects of permitting both ex-post collusions together.
sL = 0 due to ex-post downward collusion and w∅ is the main actor shaping the structure
of the contracts through ex-post upward collusion.
For case (i), we have same expected costs and for case (ii), we have higher ex-
pected costs which is equal to the case where we only permit ex-post upward collusion.
Thus, ultimately, we can claim that permitting ex-post upward collusion increases the
expected costs and the principal should prevent it. This raise in expected costs are be-
cause of ex-ante upward collusion constraint. Since the supervisor calculates her payoff
from trustworthy reporting by including bribe that will be offered if she finds an high
output, it becomes harder to keep her monitoring the agent without colluding ex-ante
with the principal.
Corollary 1 Even after ex-ante collusion constraints are introduced to the hierarchy,
preventing all types of collusions remains as the optimal strategy.
We have shown that optimal strategy of the principal does not change by comparing
each of the other three strategies as an alternative. We infer that introducing super-
vision cost brought out ex-ante collusion possibilities but it did not have any effect on
optimal strategy. The principal still finds preventing all types of collusions efficient.
When ex-post downward collusion is allowed, wage structure has slightly changed
but their weights of the wages in the expected cost function were adjusted as well. At
the end, it did not raised the expected costs. Side transfers between the agent and
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the supervisor does not relate to principal’s expected costs. We can only infer that the
money will be transferred to the supervisor from the agent but still the hierarchy works
as the principal desired.
On the other hand, when ex-post upward collusion is permitted, the principal faces
with a different situation. Objective function does not change so that each wage is
expected to be paid with same probability as it in full collusion proof case. However,
ex-ante upward collusion constraint is modified as the supervisor accounts for the bribe
she will get by colluding with the principal ex-post. The supervisor now compares her
monitoring cost with w∅ to decide whether to collude with the principal ex ante or not.
In full collusion proof case, she was also considering wH in her expected utility now
she ignores since the principal offers wH − w∅ already as a bribe for ex-post upward
collusion. wH was the reason we see
ce
µ
term in w∅. At present case, w∅ = cm(µ−µpi) , so that
cm gets more weight in this wage. Ultimately, we are in case where
(1−pi)
pi
ce ≤ cm. As
a result of this, for case (ii) where ex-ante upward collusion constraint determines the
w∅, the principal has higher expected costs. We can also directly show cmµ−µpi ≥ cm+ceµ
meaning that when ex-post upward collusion is permitted, preventing ex-ante upward
collusion is harder. This increase in w∅ leads to raises in other wages as well. In total,
when cm is above a level, full collusion proof contracts become weakly favourable for
the principal.
After showing that designing full-collusion proof contract is weakly optimal strategy
for the principal, in the next section, we now turn to the analysis of a new type of
monitoring called input monitoring.
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6 Supervisor monitors input (effort)
In this section, we derive the optimal contracts when the supervisor monitors the agent’s
effort input only. For a meaningful comparison with the output monitoring case, the
critical point is the technology of effort inspection. We shall maintain the structure of
the monitoring technology used in the output monitoring case.
Because output is no longer monitored, the probability pi that links the agent’s
effort to output becomes irrelevant. The constraints to the principal’s problem will,
accordingly, change. The supervisor obtains hard evidence of effort with probability µ,
which she can submit in her report to the principal or conceal it and submit an empty
report. With probability 1 − µ effort inspection fails and the supervisor’s report is
empty. The analysis below follows the same order as in the analysis of contracts under
output monitoring.
6.1 Optimal ex-post collusion-proof contracts
The limited liability constraints will remain as in (1); the wages paid to the supervisor
and the agent cannot be negative as in the output monitoring case. However, whereas
the agent was taking into account the possibility of a low output under high effort, now
the only relevant issue is whether effort inspection will succeed or fail. Thus, the agent’s
incentive compatibility constraint in (2) will be modified as µwH + (1 − µ)w∅ − ce ≥
µwL + (1− µ)w∅, which can be simplified to
wH − wL ≥ ce
µ
. (24)
This inequality is similar to its counterpart in the output monitoring case with the
exception that the denominator at the right hand side does not contain pi.
Similarly, assuming that the agent exerts high effort, the supervisor’s incentive com-
patibility constraint can be written as µsH + (1− µ)s∅ − cm ≥ s∅, which simplifies to
sH − s∅ ≥ cm
µ
. (25)
As in the case of output monitoring, the power of supervision incentives can be
raised by increasing sL and/or sH , the wages in the outcomes that can arise only if
the supervisor inspects. The important difference from output monitoring case is that
a low-effort report is impossible under high effort, whereas a low output report was
possible under high effort. Now, provided the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint
is satisfied, the agent will put high effort and there is no chance that monitoring can
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detect low effort level. Therefore, when the agent is induced to exert high effort the
supervisor’s incentive compatibility constraint in (25) can be satisfied by increasing sH
only, or by decreasing s∅ if possible. Observe that the incentive compatibility constraints
above are formulated under the assumption that the parties do not collude, ex-ante or
ex-post.
The occasions for ex-post collusion are identical. When the supervisor obtains effort
evidence, she should not, along with the principal or the agent, strike a deal to submit
an empty report instead of truthfully reporting the effort evidence. Thus, ex-post
downward (4) and upward collusion-proof (5) constraints do not change. Combining the
incentive compatibility constraints with limited liability and ex-post collusion-proofness
constraints, the principal’s problem can be written as
min
wL,w∅,wH ,sL,s∅,sH
µ(wH + sH) + (1− µ)(w∅ + s∅)
subject to (1), (24), (25), (4) and (5)
Note that the expression of the expected wage bill (the objective function) also
changes along with the constraints. The solution to principal’s problem is given below.
Proposition 7 Suppose that ex-ante collusions are not possible. Optimal ex-post collusion-
proof contracts and the principal’s expected cost of inducing high effort by the agent are:
(wXL , w
X
∅ , w
X
H ) = (0,
ce
µ
, ce
µ
), (sXL , s
X
∅ , s
X
H) = (
ce
µ
, 0, cm
µ
) and ECX = cm +
ce
µ
.
Although the principal does not actually pay the wages corresponding to low effort,
he has to adjust the sL wage to prevent ex-post downward collusion.
Ignoring ex-ante collusion possibilities, the ex-post collusion-proof contracts are de-
scribed in Proposition 1 (output monitoring) and Proposition 7 (input monitoring).
The differences in these propositions are purely due to the difference in the monitor-
ing methods. Regardless of the monitoring technology, the principal sets s∅ = 0 since
increasing this wage does not provide any benefit but increases the cost of collusion
prevention, by incentivizing the supervisor to deviate to submitting an empty report
and get the higher wage s∅. Thus, given s∅ = 0, observe that the ex-post downward
collusion constraint brings a lower bound for sL. In the output monitoring case, the
supervisor’s monitoring incentive depends on her wages under reports of low and high
output. Thus, if monitoring cost is below a level, the principal does not need to assign
any wage to high output, sL wage is sufficient enough to motivate the supervisor for
monitoring. However, in the input monitoring case, the supervisor knows that she does
not get sL since agent’s IC constraint will already be satisfied, so the agent’s effort
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level cannot be zero, leading to high output. It means that, the supervisor’s monitor-
ing incentive only depends on sH . The amount of this wage will directly depend on
monitoring cost and monitoring efficiency.
6.2 Optimal full collusion-proof contracts
In this section, the effects of ex-ante downward and ex-ante upward collusion constraints
will be analysed separately to observe their individual impacts on optimal contracts and
expected costs. Note that the ex-ante collusion constraints have to be redefined as it is
done for incentive constraints since they include pi variable.
6.2.1 Ex-ante downward and ex-ante upward protected contracts
Ex-ante downward constraint without any simplification is µsH+(1−µ)s∅−cm+µwH+
(1− µ)w∅ − ce ≥ s∅ +w∅. The right hand side, s∅ +w∅, represents the total utilities of
the agent-supervisor pair (the supervisor by not inspecting and the agent by exerting
low effort guarantee the wages under an empty report). Simplifying, this constraint
becomes
sH + wH ≥ ce + cm
µ
+ s∅ + w∅. (26)
The principal and the supervisor can collude before the agent decides on his effort
and the supervisor makes her monitoring decision. To prevent this, we need µsH + (1−
µ)s∅ − cm − [µ(wH + sH) + (1− µ)(w∅ + s∅) ≥ s∅ − (s∅ + w∅). Simplified version is
w∅ ≥ wH + cm
µ
. (27)
We will consider the effects of ex-ante constraints on optimal contracts separately
by adding (26) and (27) as additional constraint to EC function in (6.1). When we
analyse one one constraint we ignore the other collusion possibility.
Proposition 8
a. The optimal ex-post collusion-proof and ex-ante downward collusion-proof con-
tract (assuming ex-ante upward collusion is not possible) and the principal’s expected
cost of inducing high effort are:
(wDL , w
D
∅ , w
D
H) = (0,
ce
µ
, ce
µ
), (sDL , s
D
∅ , s
D
H) = (
ce
µ
, 0, cm+ce
µ
) and ECD = cm + ce
(1+µ)
µ
.
b. The optimal ex-post collusion-proof and ex-ante upward collusion-proof contract
(assuming ex-ante downward collusion is not possible) and the principal’s expected cost
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of inducing high effort are:
(wUL , w
U
∅ , w
U
H) = (0,
cm+ce
µ
, ce
µ
), (sUL , s
U
∅ , s
U
H) = (
cm+ce
µ
, 0, cm
µ
) and ECU = cm+ce
µ
.
In the case of input monitoring, the role of the ex-ante downward collusion constraint
is confined to raising sH ; all other wages are the same. The LHS of the ex-ante downward
constraint represents the total utility from trustworthy reporting. The wages paid for
low output cancel out from the equations. As a result, instead of combinations of
sL and sH , only the high output wage sH becomes relevant. We conclude that when
the supervisor monitors the effort level of the agent, the ex-ante downward collusion
constraint is binding and the threat of ex-ante downward collusion is credible.
Comparing proposition 4 and 5.b gives us the effect of introducing the possibility
of ex-ante upward collusion on the contracts. We see that increasing the agent’s wage
w∅ helps to eliminate the risk of ex-ante upward collusion because under collusion the
supervisor’s report will be empty, so, to eliminate his incentive to collude with the
supervisor, the principal has to penalize himself ex-ante with a higher wage payment
to the agent under an empty report. Note that ex-post upward collusion constraint is
implied by ex-ante upward collusion constraint. Both of these constraints put a bound
on w∅ but ex-ante upward collusion constraint is binding since when m=0, the principal
has to pay an additional cm
m
wage to the empty report wage of the agent. We account
for the excess utility resulting from not monitoring the agent.
6.2.2 Fully protected contracts
This section presents the optimal full-collusion proof contracts under input monitoring.
In the previous two sections, we have shown that each ex-ante collusion constraint is
binding when introduced separately. Now, we will be able to observe exact differences
between ex-post collusion proof contracts and full-collusion proof contracts.
min
wL,w∅,wH ,sL,s∅,sH
µ(wH + sH) + (1− µ)(w∅ + s∅)
subject to (1), (24), (25), (4), (5), (26) and (27)
Proposition 9 The optimal full collusion-proof contract and the principal’s correspond-
ing expected cost of inducing high effort are:
(wL, w∅, wH) = (0, cm+ceµ ,
ce
µ
), (sL, s∅, sH) = ( cm+ceµ , 0,
2cm+ce
µ
) and EC = cm
(1+µ)
µ
+
ce
(1+µ)
µ
.
An obvious implication of this proposition is that regardless of the monitoring
method, moving from ex-post-only collusion-proof contracts to full-collusion proof con-
tracts increases the expected cost for the principal significantly. At most, if µ = 1, the
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expected costs are exactly doubled, raising from ce + cm to 2ce + 2cm. But this cost
increase must be incurred to ensure that collusion possibilities are eliminated so that
the agent exerts effort.
When we consider the impact of introducing both types of ex-ante collusion pos-
sibilities at the same time, we observe their cumulative impact on optimal contracts.
Agent’s empty report wage increases from ce
µ
to cm+ce
µ
because of ex-ante upward collu-
sion constraint. This change in w∅ leads to increase in both low and high output wages
of the supervisor. First, it increases sL through ex-post downward collusion constraint.
Raised w∅ strengthens agent’s hand in ex-post downward collusion deal. To prevent
this, the principal needs to offer more to the supervisor to motivate him for revealing
low output. As we have shown in proposition 5.a, ex-ante downward collusion con-
straint is binding. Now that we increased w∅ and it is in RHS of the ex-ante downward
collusion constraint, sH needs to be increased further.
Supervisor’s IC constraint is suppressed by downward ex-ante collusion proof con-
straint as it is in the output monitoring. While the principal tries to prevent ex-ante
downward collusion, sH is set high enough that automatically gives the supervisor mon-
itoring incentive. Again, both ex-post upward and ex-ante upward constraints put a
restriction on w∅ but this time, ex-ante upward constraint directly puts a bigger restric-
tion. Another difference is that, when the input is monitored, wL term in the ex-ante
downward constraint disappears, the principal does not have to pay to the agent when
the output is low.
Preventing ex-ante collusions requires to take effort and monitoring costs into ac-
count so that intuitively ex-ante collusion proof contracts might be full collusion proof
as well. However, we found no evidence for this claim, ex-post downward constraint is
binding independently. Detailed analysis of monitoring types, effect of new introduced
ex-ante collusion constraints are given in the next section.
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7 Discussion of the results
In chapter 4 and chapter 6, we have introduced ex-ante collusion-proof constraints and
showed their effect on optimal contracts. For both output and input monitoring, we
have seen that additional ex-ante downward collusion constraint lead to an increase
in sL and sH through various mechanisms. Also, ex-ante upward collusion constraint
increased w∅ which leads to indirect increase in supervisor wages. Combining the propo-
sitions so far yields the following result, which holds regardless of whether the supervisor
is instructed to monitor the output or the input.
Corollary 2 Supervisor’s monitoring incentive is automatically satisfied when con-
tracts are designed full collusion proof.
The principal does not need to consider the supervisor’s incentive compatibility con-
straint since it is not binding. While ex-ante downward collusion is prevented through
increase in sL and sH , more than enough incentive is given to the supervisor to monitor.
Ex-ante collusion constraints include monitoring cost and effort cost as well as devia-
tions to corrupted output. It is quite logical to achieve this result. More interestingly,
same conclusion does not hold for the agent’s incentive compatibility due to inefficiency
of the effort. Unlike supervisor’s monitoring, agent’s effort creates randomness in the
output, thus we still need to adjust agent’s incentive.
Corollary 3 Regardless of type of monitoring, all four collusion constraints cannot
bind at the same time.
Although there same some links between ex-ante collusion and ex-post collusion,
preventing one type of collusion does not prevent the other. Specifically, both ex-post
downward and ex-ante downward collusion constraints are binding regardless of type of
monitoring. For both monitoring types, ex-post downward collusion constraint puts a
lower bound on sL. On the other hand, ex-ante downward collusion constraint restricts
combination of sL and sH for the output monitoring and it puts a lower bound for
sH when the input is monitored. Since these constraints determine the lower bounds
of different wages or some combination of wages and also collusion constraints are not
implied by other constraints, they are both binding. However, it is not the case for
upward collusion constraints. We have w∅ on the LHSs of these constraints meaning
that either ex-post upward collusion constraint or ex-post downward collusion constraint
should bind. When the input is monitored, ex-ante upward constraint is binding since
there is no uncertainty in the output, the principal has to pay w∅ more ex-ante to
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prevent upward collusion. For the output monitoring, it depends on the monitoring cost.
Because of the randomness of the output in the output monitoring, for ex-ante collusion
the principal considers the combination of wL and wH wages with additional monitoring
cost term. For ex-post upward collusion-proofness, we need to have a bigger wH than
w∅. If monitoring cost is lower than a limit, then ex-post upward collusion constraint
is binding. We reach to the conclusion that ex-ante upward collusion constraint is not
necessarily binding.
Next, we compare the efficiencies of both types of monitoring in terms of expected
cost that the principal will face. For the sake of analysis, we focus on ex-post collusion-
proof contract (Proposition 1-3) and both ex-post and ex-ante collusion-proof ones
(Proposition 7-9).
Corollary 4 If the same monitoring technology is available for both input and output
monitoring (producing hard evidence of the variable that is monitored with the same
probability µ) the principal prefers input monitoring, under which expected costs are
lower. This continues to hold when ex-ante collusion possibilities can be ignored.
At first sight, intuition might suggest that the principal should prefer output mon-
itoring. Since the agent’s effort does not produce high output efficiently due to to
parameter pi, there is a probability that the principal pays low output wages when the
supervisor monitors output. However, agent’s IC but supervisor’s IC, both ex-ante col-
lusion constraints and most importantly principal’s expected cost function are modified
when the input is monitored. The principal does not consider low output wages in the
expected cost calculation for input monitoring since it is known that the report cannot
be low output when the contracts are designed full collusion-proof. We infer that wages
required for full collusion-proofness for the output monitoring are higher than the one
for input monitoring.
The distinctive characteristic of the input monitoring analysis is the absence of
parameter pi. When this inefficiency variable is taken out of the model, all the related
constraints are relaxed. For example; agent’s IC becomes wH−wL ≥ ceµ from wH−wL ≥
ce
µpi
. Since pi ∈ (0, 1], when the supervisor monitor the agent’s effort level, the supervisor
can shrink the difference between wH − wL to impose agent to put effort. It means
that, now the principal can offer less to motivate the agent to induce effort.
In other words, the principal pays a higher wage in the“good” outcome under out-
put monitoring (where the supervisor has evidence of high output) than in the “good”
outcome under input monitoring (where the evidence of high effort is obtained) because
the former outcome is less likely to happen than the latter: in the output monitoring
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case the agent gets the high wage if monitoring is successful and if high effort generates
high output. For every time that the agent exerts high effort and monitoring is suc-
cessful, he gets paid the high wage with probability pi under output monitoring, with
probability one under input monitoring. Thus, the wage for high output under output
monitoring, w∗H , must be higher than the wage for high effort under input monitoring.
The principal might be unable to get back the rent he leaves to the agent because the
agent is protected by limited liability (observe that wXL is zero and cannot be reduced
any further) or by some collusion-proofness constraint. Although, we know that input
monitoring is better option than output monitoring, the underlying reason behind this
fact is not obvious and it is left to the corollary below.
Corollary 5 Collusion constraints drive the extra cost that the principal incurs under
output monitoring.
Corollary 4 states the fact that output monitoring is costly under full-collusion
proof contracts. An obvious question related to this result is whether limited liability
constraints, collusion constraints or any other factor plays a role in this difference in
expected costs. We solve the supervisor’s minimization problem excluding all collu-
sion constraints in appendix and show that expected costs are then come out equal.
Therefore, any cost difference between input and output monitoring must relate to the
collusion. It means that limited liability constraints do not generate cost difference
between output and input monitoring. However, including collusion constraints make
input monitoring cost efficient.
To find out the main reason behind the efficiency of input monitoring, we need to
refer to the Corollary 3. We have shown that binding constraints may differ for input
and output monitoring. For input monitoring, regardless of the effort and monitoring
costs, ex-ante upward collusion constraint is always binding and ex-post upward col-
lusion constraint is redundant since there is no uncertainty in the effort of the agent.
However, we have two distinguishing cases for the output monitoring depending on the
relationship between effort and monitoring cost. If monitoring cost is higher than a
level, ex-ante upward collusion constraint suppresses ex-post one as happened in the
input monitoring. In this case we end up with same expected cost for the principal. It
can be seen from Table 1, full-collusion proof contracts, case (ii) for output monitor-
ing compared with input monitoring. However, if we have (1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm, then ex-post
upward collusion constraint becomes effective and output monitoring becomes more
costly. Both upward collusion constraints puts a bound on w∅ but increase in this wage
affect other wages through remaining constraints.
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Main aim of the principal is to induce agent to exert effort. However, output moni-
toring considers the inefficiency of the agent’s effort and if monitoring cost is very low, it
takes the principal to adjust wages to prevent ex-post collusion. This is the underlying
reason behind the cost difference between types of monitoring. The principal might be
obliged to increase w∅ wage along with some other wages to prevent ex-post collusion
which is not a concern in ex-ante collusion. Thus, these further raises in wages makes
output monitoring inefficient.
We conclude that because the principal’s objective is to induce high effort (input),
providing incentive by directly monitoring the input should be less costly than providing
effort incentives indirectly by monitoring output.
37
8 Concluding remarks
We analyse the optimal incentive schemes in multi-level hierarchical institutions by us-
ing a canonical agent-supervisor-principal model. We introduce supervision cost and
extend this standard model. By usin this extented model, we introduce ex-ante col-
lusion possibilities since acquiring information will have some cost to the supervisor.
Even though ex-post collusions and their effects on the contracts have been widely
investigated in the economics literature, ex-ante collusions are less known.
At first, after introducing ex-ante collusion constraints between two parties, we
check whether there are some links between these constraints and ex-post collusion
constraints. We show that preventing one type of collusion does not prevent the other,
each of them should be treated separately. Other than these, we note that supervisor’s
incentive compatibility is automatically satisfied when the contracts are designed as full
collusion-proof.
Furthermore, we show the effect of ex-ante collusion constraints on the optimal
contracts and determine the channels leading to changes in both agent’s and supervisor’s
wages. According to our results, there is a significant increase in expected costs and in
some cases, they are even doubled.
Since expected costs are quite increased with newly introduced ex-ante constraints,
we evaluate all four possible strategies the principal is able to use to reduce the expected
costs: preventing both ex-post collusions, permitting downward ex-post collusion, per-
mitting upward ex-post collusion and permitting both ex-post collusions. We compare
expected costs for each resulting contracts and show that preventing all types of collu-
sion is weakly dominant strategy for the principal. Vafai (2016) has shown that best
strategy for the principal is to induce full ex-post collusion proof contracts when ex-ante
collusions are not present in the model. As we extend the model, we further claim that
best strategy would be to prevent all types of collusions in the hierarchy.
Lastly, we distinguish between two types of monitoring and conduct the input mon-
itoring analysis along with the output monitoring. Our results prove that in this envi-
ronment, input monitoring is efficient than output monitoring since ultimate purpose
of the principal is to impose agent to put effort. For input monitoring we have one
output, there is no uncertainty due to inefficiency of effort. Thus, ex-ante upward col-
lusion constraint always dominates ex-post upward collusion constraint. However, this
is not the case for output monitoring. Even if monitoring cost is so small, the principal
has to put a higher limit to w∅ in output monitoring to prevent ex-post upward collu-
sion. On the other hand, decrease in cm proportionally reduces w∅ in input monitoring.
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Ultimately, since the principal can ignore ex-post upward collusion due to certainty
of the output there will be a surplus coming from w∅ difference compared to output
monitoring. Therefore, delegated supervisor should monitor the effort level of the agent
instead of the output that he produces when monitoring cost is low enough.
A possible future research can involve hierarchies with more than three levels or
more than one agent. This could give us opportunity to check whether our claims
with ex-ante collusion possibilities hold or not when peer monitoring or any other
involvement happen. Also, as a robustness check similar analysis could be conducted
with continuous effort (e ∈ [0, 1]) agent-supervisor-principal models. Moreover, as the
data availability increases day by day, in the next decades, there might be sufficient
number of incidents for us to test these models.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1: First, observe that s∅ appears in two constraints only, (3)
and (4). It is easy to see that the principal must set sX∅ = 0, for if it is positive, s∅ can
be reduced without violating these constraints, which leads to a fall in the expected
cost in (1).
Second, observe also that wH must be strictly positive and (2) must be binding. If
(2) is not binding, the principal can reduce wH by some , however small so that (2)
continues to be satisfied without affecting any other constraint. Hence, wXH = w
X
L +
ce
µpi
.
Through (5), this lower bound for wH implies a lower bound for w∅, hence, wX∅ = w
X
H .
So far we have established
wXH = w
X
∅ = w
X
L +
ce
µpi
.
Using this fact, (4) can be written as
sL ≥ ce
µpi
. (28)
It now follows that wL must be set minimally, w
X
L = 0, because the only constraint
where it appears, (2), will be softened by reducing wL, to also reduce the expected
cost for the principal. Thus, wX∅ =
ce
µpi
and wXH =
ce
µpi
. The optimal agent contract is
(wXL , w
X
∅ , w
X
H ) = (0,
ce
µpi
, ce
µpi
).
Now observe that the left hand side of (3), µ[pisH + (1 − pi)sL] ≥ cm appears also
in the cost function (1). Clearly, cost minimization requires sL and sH be set at lowest
possible values satisfying µ[pisH + (1 − pi)sL] ≥ cm and (28). There can be two cases
according to whether the wages sL =
ce
µpi
and sH = 0 satisfy µ[pisH + (1 − pi)sL] ≥ cm
or not. So:
1. If (1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm, the optimal wages are sXL = ceµpi , sXH = 0.
2. If (1−pi)
pi
ce < cm, setting the wages as sL =
ce
µpi
, sH = 0 violates the supervisor’s
incentive compatibility constraint. Either sL or sH must be raised to satisfy that
constraint with equality: µ[pisH + (1− pi)sL] = cm. While the exact combination of the
wage modification is not relevant for the principal’s cost, the bounds in which the two
wages could be adjusted can be determined, as follows: If sH = 0, then sL must be
raised (above ce
µpi
) to cm
µ(1−pi) . Therefore, the range of adjustment for s
X
L is the interval
[ ce
µpi
, cm
µ(1−pi) ]. On the other hand, if sL is set minimally, sL =
ce
µpi
, then sH =
cm
µpi
− (1−pi)
pi
ce
µpi
.
Therefore, the range of adjustment for sXH is the interval [0,
cm
µpi
− (1−pi)
pi
ce
µpi
].
The supervisor’s contract is thus as stated in the proposition. Plugging in the op-
timal wages in (1) yields the expected cost for the principal. Q.E.D.
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Proof of proposition 2.a: Since s∅ is at the right hand side of all the constraints in
which it appears, it is optimal to set sD∅ = 0.
Moving to the agent’s wages, inspecting (4), (5) and (6) reveals that (4) must be
binding, which means wD∅ = w
D
H , given s
D
∅ = 0. Using these findings, (6) becomes
µ[pisH + (1− pi)sL] + µ(1− pi)wL ≥ cm + ce + µ(1− pi)wH .
To see that the agent’s incentive-compatibility constraint (2) must be binding, observe
that otherwise it would be possible to reduce wH and economize on expected costs
without violating any of the constraints. Thus, wDH = w
D
L +
ce
µpi
. Using this result, (6)
now becomes
µ[pisH + (1− pi)sL] ≥ cm + ce
pi
(29)
This constraint implies the supervisor’s incentive-compatibility constraint (3), which
we shall drop after this point, leaving us with (2), (4), (5) and (29) as constraints, of
which (2) and (4) are binding, with sD∅ = 0. Now, because the agent’s wages do not
appear in (29) and the remaining constraints are so far identical, the agent’s optimal
contract must be the same as the contract described in Proposition 1.
From this point on, the supervisor’s optimal contract is derived using the same ar-
guments as in Proposition 1, except that the constraint (3) is replaced by (29). The
left hand side of (29) is an expected cost item in (1), which the principal would seek
to minimize by binding, if possible, (29). It turns out that (29) must be binding. To
see this, suppose on the contrary, that (29) is not binding. Then, to minimize costs the
principal must be binding all other constraints by setting sL =
ce
µpi
, sH = 0. However,
this violates (29), which becomes 0 ≥ cm+ ce. We conclude that the optimal supervisor
wages are non-negative numbers sDL and s
D
H satisfying µ[pis
D
H + (1 − pi)sDL ] = cm + cepi ,
with minimum bounds given by sH = 0 and sL =
ce
µpi
(from (4)). For sH = 0 the prin-
cipal can set sL =
picm+ce
µpi(1−pi) , and for sL =
ce
µpi
the principal can set sH =
cm
µpi
− (1−µ−pi)
µpi
ce
µpi
.
Substituting the optimal wages into (1) yields the minimum expected cost. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2.b: Additional constraint (7) does not have s∅ variable in it.
Therefore, we again set sU∅ = 0. Increasing wH increases expected cost for principal and
makes (7) and (5) harder to satisfy, hence we set wUH = w
U
L +
ce
µpi
that is minimum wage
it can be assigned due to agent’s IC constraint. After that, we change wH term in (7)
with our finding. After a simplification, (7) becomes w∅ ≥ cm+ceµ + wL. Also, we have
another condition for w∅ that is w∅ ≥ wL + ceµpi from (5). Now, to relax (4) and decrease
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expected for principal we should set wU∅ to its minimum level. In this case, one of the
above constraints should be binding, hence we have two cases to be analysed.
1. (5) is binding and (7) is not binding meaning that ce
µpi
≥ cm+ce
µ
. When we simplify
it, we have (1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm. If this is the case we should set wU∅ = ceµpi +wUL . Then, we can
readily set wUL = 0 resulting in w
U
∅ =
ce
µpi
and wH =
ce
µpi
. We directly set sL =
ce
µpi
and
sUH = 0 and then check whether (3) is satisfied. When we put these into the equation,
it gives us the same condition with choice of wU∅ that is
(1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm. It means that
supervisor’s IC is automatically satisfied. Therefore, indeed we should have sUL =
ce
µpi
and sUH = 0.
2. (7) is binding and (5) is not binding meaning that cm+ce
µ
≥ ce
µpi
. When we simplify
it, we have cm ≥ (1−pi)pi ce. If this is the case, we should set wU∅ = cm+ceµ + wUL . By using
this information, we get rid of wL in LHS of (4). After that, there is no advantage of
increasing wUL , so w
U
L = 0. We also acquire, w
U
∅ =
cm+ce
µ
and wUH =
ce
µpi
. If we ignore
(3) for now, we set sUL =
cm+ce
µ
. We should set sUH = 0 and then check whether (3) is
satisfied. When we incorporate these sUL and s
U
H wages into the equation, it gives us the
exact opposite condition with choice of wU∅ that is
(1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm. Therefore, these values
do not satisfy supervisor’s IC constraint automatically. Principal should increase either
sUL or s
U
H to satisfy (3). If we still let s
U
H = 0, we can increase s
U
L from
cm+ce
µ
to cm
µ(1−pi) .
Also, we cannot decrease sUL below
cm+ce
µ
. Therefore, sUL = [
cm+ce
µ
, cm
µ(1−pi) ]. On the other
hand, we could set sUL to the minimum level restricted by (4) and increase sH . When
sUL =
cm+ce
µ
we should set sUH =
cm
µ
− (1−pi)
µpi
. Therefore, we have sUH = [
cm
µ
− (1−pi)
µpi
, 0].
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3: We have 7 constraints in total. Decreasing s∅ softens related
constraints, so s∅ = 0. wH exist in LHS of (6) and wL is in LHS of (4). Therefore, it
is better to proceed with adjustment of w∅. Setting w∅ as small as possible is better
since it softens (4) and (6). There are two constraint that can bind w∅, those are (5)
and (7). Both cannot bind at the same time, hence there are two cases to be analysed.
1. (5) is binding and (7) is not binding meaning that wH ≥ cmµ + [piwH + (1−pi)wL].
Then, we should set w∅ = wH . With this information (6) becomes µ[pisH + (1 −
pi)sL] + µ(1 − pi)wL ≥ µ(1 − pi)wH + cm + ce. After this, wH goes to the RHS, hence
wH = wL +
ce
µpi
. By changing wH , (6) comes out as µ[pisH + (1 − pi)sL] ≥ cepi + cm.
Supervisor’s IC constraint will not bind and it can be ignored after this point. Simplified
version of constraint permits us to set wL = 0 directly. Other agent’s wages are w∅ =
ce
µpi
and wH =
ce
µpi
. At the beginning, we made assumption about binding constraint,
it should be checked with the wages we claimed. When we incorporate them into
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wH ≥ cmµ + [piwH + (1 − pi)wL], it is simplified as 1−pipi ce ≥ cm. After that we check
whether sL =
ce
µpi
and sH = 0 directly satisfy (6). It comes out as −ce ≥ cm which is
not possible. Therefore, principal has to increase sL and sH wages to satisfy (6) such
that µ[pisH + (1 − pi)sL] ≥ cepi + cm while sL ≥ ceµpi . At the end, sL = [ ceµpi , picm+ceµpi(1−pi) ] and
sH = [
cm
µpi
− (1−µ−pi)
µpi
ce
µpi
, 0].
2. (7) is binding and (5) is not binding. In that case, we should have cm
µ
+ [piwH +
(1 − pi)wL] ≥ wH . We set w∅ = cmµ + [piwH + (1 − pi)wL]. Incorporating this to (6)
results in [pisH + (1 − pi)sL] ≥ 2cm + ce, hence (3). After that, we set wH = wL + ceµpi .
putting this information into w∅ gives w∅ = cmµ +
ce
µ
+ wL. Setting w∅ in (4) cancels
wL which allows us to set wL = 0. Also, wH =
ce
µpi
and w∅ = cmµ +
ce
µ
. When we
check our assumption on w∅ at the beginning, it gives the condition 1−pipi ce ≤ cm. We
continue with checking sL =
cm+ce
µ
and sH = 0 satisfy (6) or not. Putting them into the
(6) simplifies as 1−pi
pi
ce ≥ cm that is the opposite condition that we are operating now.
Therefore, these wages do not satisfy ex-ante downward constraint automatically and
principal should increase any of them such that µ[pisH + (1 − pi)sL] = 2cm + ce while
sL ≥ cm+ceµ . At the end, sL = [ cm+ceµ , 2cm+ceµ(1−pi) ] and sH = [ (1+pi)cm+piceµpi , 0]. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4: Set wL = 0, bribing constraint becomes redundant since
w∅ ≥ wH ≥ k. Also, we can choose sL = 0 and ex-post downward collusion constraint
becomes irrelevant as well. With this information, s∅ = 0 becomes obvious. Remaining
constraints are as follows
w∅ ≥ wH .
wH ≥ ce
µpi
.
µpisH + w∅(µ− µpi) ≥ cm.
µpisH + µpiwH ≥ cm + ce + µpiw∅.
w∅ ≥ cm
µ
+ piwH .
If we rewrite supervisor’s IC constraint as µpisH+µpiw∅ ≥ cm+µpiw∅ and since w∅ ≥ wH ,
we can say that ex-ante downward collusion constraint is harder to satisfy. Thus,
supervisor’s IC becomes irrelevant afterwards. We need to choose minimal wage for w∅
since it lowers the expected cost. We have two constraints that can determine lower
bound for w∅: either ex-post upward collusion constraint or ex-ante upward collusion
constraint.
1. Assume that ex-post upward collusion constraint is binding. Then, we should
have w∅ ≥ wH ≥ cmµ + piwH and w∅ = wH . Increasing wH increases the expected cost,
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so wH =
ce
µpi
. Incorporate this to the preceding inequality, we are in case (1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm.
Other wages are w∅ = ceµpi and sH =
cm+ce
µpi
.
2. If ex-ante upward collusion constraint is binding, we have w∅ ≥ piwH + cmµ ≥ wH
and w∅ = piwH + cmµ . Ex-ante downward collusion constraint becomes sH +(1−pi)wH ≥
cm
1+pi
µpi
+ ce
µpi
. We need to set wH =
ce
µpi
since one unit increase in sH and wH costs same
but sH helps more to satisfy ex-ante downward collusion constraint. Thus, we can pre-
vent ex-ante downward collusion by offering less wage. We end up in case (1−pi)
pi
ce ≤ cm.
Other constraints are w∅ = cm+ceµ and sH = cm
1+pi
µpi
+ ce
µ
. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 5: Begin bey setting s∅ = 0. Ex-post upward collusion
constraint implies bribing constraint. Simplified remaining constraints are
wH ≥ w∅ + k.
w∅ ≥ wL + ce
µpi
.
µpisH + sL(µ− µpi) + µpiwH ≥ cm + µpiw∅.
sL + wL ≥ w∅.
µpisH + µpiwH + sL(µ− µpi) + wL(µ− µpi) ≥ cm + ce + µw∅.
w∅ ≥ cm
µ− µpi + wL.
Since we need to choose minimal w∅, we will have two cases again. Either agent’s IC
or ex-ante upward collusion constraint is binding.
1. Assume that binding constraint is agent’s IC, we are in case (1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm. Set
w∅ = wL + ceµpi . Now, all the wL wages are on the RHSs of the remaining constraints, so
wL = 0, w∅ = ceµpi . Downward ex-ante collusion constraint implies supervisor’s IC. At
the end we need to set µpiwH + (µ − µpi)sL + µpisH = cm + ce + cepi while two of these
wages have a lower bound.
2. If upward ex-ante upward collusion constraint is binding. Set w∅ = wL + cmµ−µpi
and we have (1−pi)
pi
ce ≤ cm, exact opposite case. Again setting wL = 0 is optimal and
ex-ante downward collusion constraint implies supervisor’s IC constraint. For cost min-
imization, we set µpiwH + (µ − µpi)sL + µpisH = cm + ce + cmµ−µpi . Just as in the case
above, we have some lower bounds on two wages as well. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 6: Setting wL and sL to their lowest bound softens all the
related constraints, so that we begin with sL = 0, wL = 0. Since we have s∅ + w∅ ≥
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w∅ ≥ ceµpi ≥ k, (8) and (9) are redundant. For the remaining constraints, s∅ wage is
always in RHSs, set s∅ = 0. (14) becomes redundant since (15) is harder to satisfy.
Simplified version of he remaining constraints are as follows:
wH ≥ w∅ + k.
w∅ ≥ ce
µpi
.
µpisH + µpiwH ≥ cm + w∅(2µpi − µ).
µpisH + µpiwH ≥ cm + ce + µpiw∅.
w∅ ≥ cm
(µ− µpi) .
Supervisor’s IC constraint (21) becomes redundant since ex-ante downward collusion
constraint (22) puts a higher bound on combination of sL and sH . Either (20) or (23)
should determine the bound for w∅; we have two cases to be analysed.
1. Assume that (20) is binding, w∅ ≥ ceµpi ≥ cm(µ−µpi) . We are in case 1−pipi ce ≥ cm. We
set w∅ = ceµpi to minimize the expected cost of the principal. Also, for optimization we
need sH + wH =
cm+2ce
µpi
while wH ≥ ceµpi + k.
2. When (23 is binding, we need to have 1−pi
pi
ce ≤ cm. Setting w∅ = cm(µ−µpi) is opti-
mal. To minimize the expected cost, the principal sets sH + wH =
cm
µpi(1−pi) +
ce
µpi
while
wH ≥ cmµ−µpi + k. Q.E.D.
Proof of corollary 1: To prove this corollary, we need to compare the expected costs
for the principal between proposition 3 and proposition 4,5 and 6 separately. Condition
separating two cases is same in each proposition, so we compare the costs for each case
separately.
Comparison of case (i): All the expected costs are same, EC = cm + ce
(1+µpi)
µpi
, if
(1−pi)
pi
ce ≥ cm that is monitoring cost is below a level.
Comparison of case (ii): If (1−pi)
pi
ce ≤ cm, expected cost of full collusion proof con-
tracts and downward collusion permitted contracts are same. Also, expected cost of
upward collusion permitted and both collusions permitted contracts are same. Assume
that full collusion proof is cost efficient, cm + ce +
cm
µ−µpi ≥ cm (1+µ)µ + ce 1+µµ . After a
simplification, we acquire (1−pi)
pi
ce ≤ cm meaning that full collusion proof contracts cost
less. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 7: Set sX∅ = 0 since all s∅ variables are in RHSs of the con-
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straints. (25) becomes sH ≥ cmµ and (4) becomes sL + wL ≥ w∅. Set wX∅ = wXH and
wXH = w
X
L +
ce
µ
since reducing w∅ and wH decreases expected cost for principal and also
relaxes (4) so that we set them to their lowest bounds. We have wXH = w
X
∅ = w
X
L +
ce
µ
.
Incorporating this to the (4), we acquire sL ≥ ceµ . Then, there is no bound on wL, so we
set wXL = 0, w
X
∅ =
ce
µ
and wXH =
ce
µ
. Remaining variables come out as sXL =
ce
µ
, sX∅ = 0
and sXH =
cm
µ
. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 8.a: Reducing s∅ relaxes (25), (4) and (26), set sD∅ = 0. We
then adjust wD∅ = w
D
H since decreasing w∅ relaxes (4) and (26). Also, it reduces EC.
With these findings, (26) becomes sH ≥ cm+ceµ .
Resulting that new ex-ante downward collusion constraint suppresses new supervisor
incentive compatibility constraint which makes it redundant. We have wH ≥ wL + ceµ ,
sL + wL ≥ wH , sH ≥ cm+ceµ . Increasing wL leads to an increase in wH , thus it is not
optimal. Setting wDL = 0 gives w
D
H =
ce
µ
and sDL =
ce
µ
. At last, we set sDH =
cm+ce
µ
that
is its lowest bound and wD∅ =
ce
µ
. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 8.b: (27) puts a bigger bound on w∅ than (5). Therefore,
(5) is implied by (27). Set wU∅ = w
U
H +
cm
µ
, wUH = w
U
L +
ce
µ
to their minimum bounds.
We directly set sU∅ = 0 and using this as information sH =
cm
µ
. Increasing wL does not
change the wH−wL, so that it is optimal to set to minimum value restricted by limited
liabilities. wUL = 0, wH =
ce
µ
, w∅ = cm+ceµ . Then, sL =
cm+ce
µ
when we set it minimally.
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 9: (5) is redundant. Set w∅ = wH + cmµ and s∅ = 0. (26)
becomes sH ≥ ce+2cmµ and (25) becomes sH ≥ cmµ . Then, (25) is redundant. Remaining
constraints are wH −wL ≥ ceµ , sH ≥ ce+2cmµ , sL +wL ≥ wH + cmµ . We set wH minimally
to wH = wL +
ce
µ
. To minimize expected cost, we have wL = 0. At the end, setting sim-
plified constraints to their minimum gives sH =
ce+2cm
µ
, wH =
ce
µ
, w∅ = ce+cmµ . Q.E.D.
Proof of corollary 2: Looking at the proposition 3 and 6, we have 2 cases for the
output monitoring and single case for the input monitoring.
Output monitoring case (i): (5) dominates (7), so w∅ ≥ wH . From (2), we have
wH ≥ wL + ceµpi . Combining these information, we end with the relationship w∅ ≥ wH ≥
wL +
ce
µpi
. We can say that any combination of sH and sL will be smaller than w∅, so
w∅ ≥ piwH + (1 − pi)wL. Using this information in (6) yields µ[pisH + (1 − pi)sL] ≥
µs∅ + cm + ce ≥ s∅ + cm.
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Output monitoring case (ii): Inserting (7) into (6) directly gives us µ[pisH + (1 −
pi)sL] ≥ µs∅ + 2cm + ce ≥ s∅ + cm.
Input monitoring: Using inequality (27) in (26), results in sH − s∅ ≥ 2cm+ceµ ≥ cmµ .
Q.E.D.
Proof of corollary 3: Ex-post and ex-ante downward collusion constraints are
independent of each other. Regardless of type of monitoring they are binding. When
we look at upward collusion constraints, we distinguish between monitoring types.
1) When the supervisor monitors the input ex-post upward collusion constraint is
suppressed by ex-ante upward collusion constraint.
2) In the case of output monitoring, depending on the effort and monitoring cost
either ex-post upward or ex-ante upward binds. Naturally, if monitoring cost is too
much, binding constraint will be ex-ante one since it requires to calculate the supervi-
sor’s expected utility surpluss coming from not working. Q.E.D.
Proof of corollary 4: We begin with the comparison of expected costs for ex-post
collusion-proof contracts. Then we look at full-collusion proof contracts, so that we
have two cases to be analysed.
1. Assume that output monitoring is more costly compared to input monitoring
in the case of ex-post collusion-proof contracts. Then we should have ce
µpi
≥ cm + ceµ if
1−pi
pi
ce ≥ cm. Interchanging the terms and taking out them to gives 1−piµpi ce ≥ cm. And
since µ ∈ (0, 1], 1−pi
µpi
ce ≥ 1−pipi ce which satisfies our if condition.
Also, we need cm +
1−µ+µpi
µpi
ce ≥ cm + ceµ if 1−pipi ce ≤ cm. Simplifying the inequality
gives us 1
pi
− µ
pi
+µ ≥ 1 and then we have 1 ≥ pi. Since this is true, our assumption holds.
For ex-post collusion-proof contracts, output monitoring is more costly to conduct.
2. Assume that output monitoring is more costly compared to input monitoring
in the case of full collusion-proof contracts. Then we should have cm +
1+µpi
µpi
ce ≥
1+µ
µ
cm +
1+µ
µ
ce. Simplification brings us to the condition that we are in:
1−pi
pi
ce ≥ cm
meaning that our assumption holds.
If 1−pi
pi
ce ≤ cm both input monitoring and output monitoring have same expected
cost. Therefore, input monitoring weakly dominates output monitoring. Q.E.D.
Proof of corollary 5: To prove this statement, we derive contracts without collusion
constraints. If the expected costs come out equal, then we conclude that extra costs
are due to collusion constraint, otherwise limited liabilities would be effective.
First, we solve the minimization problem of the principal under output monitoring
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subject to (1), (2) and (3). Optimal contracts satisfying limited liabilities with incentive
compatibility constraint becomes (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, 0, ceµpi ), (sL, s∅, sH) = (σL, 0, σH)
such that µ[piσH + (1− pi)σL] = cm and EC = ce + cm.
Solving for the same problem under input monitoring results in: (wL, w∅, wH) =
(0, 0, ce
µ
), (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0, cmµ ) and EC = ce + cm.
Since expected costs are same when the collusion-proofness constraints are excluded
and as we proved in the preceding corollary, output monitoring is costly than input
monitoring when the principal prevents collusions, we conclude that the difference in
expected costs are because of collusion constraints. Q.E.D.
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